CAN EUROPE SURVIVE GERMANY'S NEW NATIONALISM? John B. Judis

THE NEW REPUBLIC

DOES POVERTY CAUSE TERRORISM?
Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Malečková

DID PAKISTAN'S NUKES AVERT WAR?
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

HOMELAND SECURITY TAKE 2

Ryan Lizza, Michael Crowley, Noam Scheiber, Peter Beinart, The Editors

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See no evil

TO THE EDITORS:

As a Jew who lives among conservative, Bible Belt Christians, I was astonished by Peter Beinart's argument that I should distrust their friendship with Israel ("Bad Move," May 20). I've discussed Israel with at least a hundred conservative Christian patients, colleagues, and neighbors in the last year. Religious beliefs color some of their political views, but few couch their support for Israel in religious terms. Most simply feel that Israel is a righteous democracy that is under attack by dictatorships. Most also despise moral relativism and the appeasement of evil. Only one or two have suggested that Israel should expel Palestinians from the West Bank or have otherwise resembled the conservative, evangelical leaders mentioned by Beinart.

Beinart is correct that Israel's security has come to dominate the political agenda for many Jews. In this regard, many of my secular or "liberal" Democratic acquaintances consider Israel the aggressor or even an apartheid state. Unless Democrats start to clearly support Israel and take an aggressive stance on Iraq and Iran, I will hold my nose, switch parties, and donate very heavily to the Republicans for the first time in my 44 years. If the election were held today, I'd already be a Republican.

JUSTIN COHEN, M.D.
Charleston, West Virginia

Hear me out

TO THE EDITORS:

One of Jason Zengerle's reasons for not giving George W. Bush's nominees a judiciary hearing and an up-or-down vote is that a president who was not popularly elected by a majority should not ultimately be allowed to move the courts to the right ("Judge Not," May 20). Thus Zengerle seems to attach some importance to the popular will. However, he then goes on to defend the practice of not having hearings and up-and-down votes (stalling) because to do otherwise would expose Southern Democratic senators to electoral risk. He is troubled that these senators might feel pressured by interest groups, opposing candidates, and ultimately constituents to support conservative nominees.

But isn't this what the democratic process is ultimately about? One reason stalling is not as costly politically is that it tends to keep low the level of information available to the general public. If Zengerle is so concerned about the will

of the popular electoral majority, then why shouldn't senators of both parties be responsible for publicly going on the record with their position on these judicial nominees? Otherwise, Zengerle is simply advocating yet another end run around the popular electoral majority he appears to implicitly celebrate.

LOUIS J. AYALA
Assistant Professor of Political Science
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana

Anchors aweigh

TO THE EDITORS:

Rob Walker's article "Anchor Steam" does not significantly differ from the network news he is critiquing: It leaves a lot to be desired (May 20). First, let's be clear: The shallowness of the network-news programs is hardly news to any TNR reader. Indeed, other magazines have made the same point; at least a few of them (journalism journals) have made a far more scientific effort to tabulate the hard- and soft-news aspects of each of the network programs. Beyond this, Walker can't quite seem to decide what to criticize—just that criticism is needed. For example, he criticizes the networks for assuming their viewers are more knowledgeable than they really are (on economic matters) but also for being "gullible ignoramuses." Which is it?

Walker makes the point that the networks are all too interested in getting us outraged rather than informing us. There is truth in this observation, but I would suggest that a primary personality characteristic of most journalists is (and, I think, we should want it to be) skepticism, particularly skepticism of the government and of others in control of our lives. Dan Rather's "populism" (as Walker describes it) seems precisely what a "free press" should be all about. This characteristic can lead to excesses—skepticism that turns to mindless cynicism—but I think it is worth the risk.

JOSHUA DRESSLER
Frank R. Strong Chair in Law
Michael E. Moritz College of Law
The Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio

Air control

TO THE EDITORS:

Franklin Foer's article implies that The Rendon Group is running "the p.r. war against terrorism," but credit goes to President George W. Bush's counselor, Karen Hughes, who created the Coalition Information Center with her British counterparts ("Flacks Americana," May 20). Indeed, the credit (and the nation's collective admiration) belongs to the president, our armed forces, and personnel from the White House, Pentagon, State Department, and other agencies who every day make tough decisions and place their lives in harm's way. Contrary to your article, I have consistently advocated that the United States confront terrorists in the information war—daily and on a medium- and long-term basis. At all times the United States must vigorously refute terrorists in the media and information environment and voice objection when they hijack Islam as justification for their horrific actions.

I am extremely proud of all my current and former colleagues. Some may have been young, but all were professional, dedicated, nonpartisan, untiring, and effective. Our efforts, while not as influential as Foer's article suggests, have been commended by our clients and have earned us their trust. Finally, with respect to Foer's characterization of me as "dough-faced," thanks to diet and exercise I have dropped 70 pounds since the TNR cover photo was taken in September 1998.

JOHN W. RENDON
President
The Rendon Group
Washington, D.C.

TO THE EDITORS:

Thank you for the only coherent account I have read of the U.S. government's fumbling efforts to launch a public relations campaign aimed at the peoples of the Middle East. It is apparent to me that what the government should have done—in fact, should *still* do—is hire one of the large multinational p.r. agencies with

continued on page 41

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The Three R's Of Accountability

Kurt M. Landgraf, President & CEO of Educational Testing Service

The "No Child Left Behind" Act presents a unique window of opportunity for improving America's schools, especially those that have been traditionally underserved and are considered at risk. To seize this chance to bridge the achievement gap in our schools, the education community and general public must focus on what might be called "the three R's" of accountability: **Responsiveness**, **Responsibility** and **Readiness**.

- **Responsiveness**: Interventions and instructional strategies must ensure that all children are provided with meaningful, quality educational opportunities that meet their communities' academic, cultural and linguistic needs.
- **Responsibility**: Proper test use must be considered at each stage — from development, administration and scoring, to the reporting of student results.
- **Readiness**: Information derived from tests must be used strategically to identify targeted interventions designed to meet the academic needs of specific student populations in a sustained manner.

The three R's are doable. The goals are already in place for all students. As educators, we must embrace some critical resource issues that have proven to make a real difference in learning. For example, we know that early education is most effective. Language and cultural factors need to be considered if long-term positive gains of standards-based instruction are to be attained. Our children spend a lot of time in before- and after-school programs with providers that may lack sufficient knowledge and training. We must ensure that quality time on academics is emphasized.

Here are the four steps of accountability that must be met:

1. Set clear goals for achieving academic excellence for all in our schools.
2. Recommend specific, clear solutions for immediate implementation targeting at-risk learners.
3. Establish reachable benchmarks to be reported every year, showing the public what progress was made toward these goals by each school.
4. Show concrete evidence of reaching these goals within three years with replicable steps to ratchet up the model and share what works.

We must all hold ourselves accountable to the pledge of better instruction and increased learning for all.

Educators must insist on being accountable for all students; however, accountability extends to all of us — elected officials, policymakers and parents. We must all hold ourselves accountable to the pledge of better instruction and increased learning for all. The achievement gap is the product of decades of inequities — but we can't afford to take that long to fix it for our children.

ETS Educational Testing Service

We invite you to continue this dialogue by contacting us via e-mail at: issues@ets.org

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TRB

FROM WASHINGTON

Odd Job

IN ITS FIRST week of hearings, the joint House-Senate Intelligence Committee investigating September 11 chose not to call CIA Director George Tenet to testify. Which is a good thing, since Tenet wasn't in the country. As the committee began its inquiry into the greatest intelligence failure in modern American history, the man responsible for making sure it doesn't happen again was doing his other job. He was in the West Bank as the Bush administration's de facto envoy to the Middle East.

Tenet began this second job mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict six years ago, when reasonable people could still argue that preventing terrorists from killing Americans didn't warrant single-minded attention. After a spate of Hamas suicide bombings rocked the peace process in early 1996, Tenet—then the CIA deputy director—was sent to help Yasir Arafat combat the militants. His mission was to professionalize the Palestinian security forces, thus helping them win the confidence of their Israeli counterparts.

But as the years passed, and Palestinian terrorism continued, Israeli and Palestinian officials grew more hostile, not less. And as a result, both sides came to rely on Langley more and more. In October 1998, when former President Bill Clinton dragged Benjamin Netanyahu to Maryland's Wye River to revive the faltering Oslo process, Tenet (by then CIA director) was present throughout the nine-day-long talks. And in the end Netanyahu only agreed to additional Israeli withdrawals because Tenet assured him he would personally oversee Arafat's crackdown on terrorism. Over the course of the Clinton administration, Tenet visited the Middle East ten times. So intimate was his relationship with Arafat that at the fateful July 2000 Camp David negotiations, when Clinton could not get a yes or no answer from the Palestinian leader on Ehud Barak's final offer, he turned to Tenet. And it was the CIA director who elicited Arafat's clear reply: No.

Off the record, CIA officials worried that Tenet was diverting resources from the Agency's core mission of intelligence-gathering and analysis. And according to Rob Malley, Clinton's special assistant for Arab-Israeli affairs, "[M]ore than once, toward the end of the Clinton term, Tenet came to the president and the national security adviser and told them that the mediation assignment given to him is not good for him and isn't good for the Agency." But by that time Clinton had become convinced that an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal was key to his legacy, and he wouldn't surrender one of the most effective tools at his disposal.

It was exactly the kind of behavior that has led post-9/11 conservatives to excoriate Clinton for ignoring the growing terrorist threat. The former president—who had treated his first CIA director, R. James Woolsey, with disdain—seemed almost indifferent to the Agency's traditional spy work. And in keeping with his globalization-addled view that military conflict was receding as a factor in international affairs, he appeared happy to let the CIA turn its energy from national security to conflict resolution. As former Mossad official David Kimche told the *Jerusalem Post* in 1998, "It is the changing face of the CIA. They are coming out in the open. They are doing more political things, and not truly intelligence actions."

But the problem with blaming Clinton for taking the CIA's eye off the ball is that George W. Bush has continued the pattern. After an initial six months in which the new administration tried to distance itself from the Israeli-Palestinian train wreck, a hideous June 2001 bombing at a Tel Aviv discotheque sent the Bushies scrambling to forestall massive Israeli retaliation and a widening crisis. Tenet—the only prominent peace processor left over from the Clinton administration—had a better relationship with the parties than did any member of the incoming Bush foreign policy team. And so the president ordered him to revive his mission.

Over time other Bush officials—Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs William Burns, retired General Anthony Zinni, and even Secretary of State Colin Powell himself—tried their hand at Mideast diplomacy. But with the change of government in Israel, the Bushies came to rely on Tenet for another reason. The cornerstone of Ariel Sharon's policy was that there could be no political negotiations until Palestinian violence ceased. And in the absence of a peace process, Tenet's security process—his ongoing efforts to get Israeli and Palestinian security officials to cooperate to prevent terrorism—became the only game in town. According to the oft-repeated formulation, the parties had to agree to "Tenet" (the security agreement) before they could proceed to "Mitchell" (the road map to talks about land-for-peace). But because the parties never really got to Tenet—the violence never stopped for very long—the CIA director kept shuttling back to the region to put his finger in the dike.

Astonishingly, Tenet's travel schedule continued—even increased—after 9/11. In late January of this year a senior administration official told reporters, "[I]t's important for Congress to review [9/11-related] events in a way that does not unduly burden the defense and intelligence communities, as they are still charged with fighting a war." But the following month Bush dispatched Tenet to the Middle East, the first of three peace-process-related trips he has made to the region this year.

To Tenet's credit, he has—by most accounts—done an excellent job in maintaining the trust of both Israeli and Palestinian security officials, even as they have lost any shred of trust in one another. But he has done well in a job he should not being doing at all. After September 11 the Bush administration should have given Tenet's Mideast security portfolio to someone at the Defense Department or risked Sharon's wrath and given it to a diplomat, who would have discussed security and political issues at the same time. Given the circumstances, it doesn't much matter—it just shouldn't have been taking up Tenet's time.

CIA officials, of course, insist Tenet's peace-processing has subtracted nothing from his efforts to prevent future terrorist attacks. But stopping Al Qaeda from striking tomorrow—while simultaneously restructuring a hidebound, complex bureaucracy—isn't just a full-time job; it's one of the most important jobs ever entrusted to any American official. And Tenet's inability to treat it as such may be one reason that the CIA is now—after FBI Director Robert Mueller's reorganization plan and Bush's proposal for a Department of Homeland Security—the one major anti-terrorism agency that has not remade itself for the post-9/11 world.

In his nationally televised speech last Thursday, Bush noted sternly that if frontline anti-terrorism investigators "see something that raises suspicions ... I expect your supervisors to treat it with the seriousness it deserves." But for the six days leading up to the speech, the CIA's top supervisor, George Tenet, had been in Israel pursuing Middle East peace. Which makes you wonder whether the CIA's mission—to stop terrorists from killing Americans—is being treated "with the seriousness it deserves" by Tenet's supervisor, President George W. Bush.

PETER BEINART

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Home Alone

AS TNR WENT to press, John Ashcroft's revelation that the United States had captured an Al Qaeda operative seeking to build a dirty bomb was distracting attention from President George W. Bush's dramatic unveiling of his plan for a Department of Homeland Security. That announcement, in turn, had distracted attention from whistle-blower Coleen Rowley's testimony about FBI bungling, which, in turn, had distracted attention from the Democrats' call for a blue-ribbon commission to investigate the intelligence failures preceding September 11.

All of which is fine, as far as it goes. But sometime over the last month Washington seems to have forgotten that there's another component to homeland security, and it has nothing to do with removing the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service from the Department of Agriculture: It's called the war on terrorism.

Rhetorically, the Bush team seems to understand this. In a West Point speech two weeks ago, the president outlined a strategy of "preemption," whereby the United States would venture overseas to slay dragons before they reached our shores. But you wouldn't know it from the administration's record over the past few months. Nowhere has the distance between forceful words and feeble deeds been starker than in the case of Iraq. Having defined the threat posed by Saddam in the aftermath of 9/11 as "a grave and growing danger," the administration has since opted for ever-more equivocal action—loosening U.N. sanctions; hinting that it may support a revival of the U.N.'s farcical weapons-inspections regime; and declining to boost aid to the Iraqi opposition. "I have no war plans on my desk," Bush assured a grateful European audience last month.

The war on terror's momentum has even ground to a halt in Central Asia. The United States has obstructed attempts to expand peacekeeping operations beyond Kabul, all but inviting Afghanistan to descend back into the chaos that made it a hospitable base for terrorists in the first place. More troubling still, Afghanistan's neighbor Pakistan in recent months has been transformed from the principal sponsor of Osama bin Laden's forces into their principal refuge. American officials have pressed only gingerly for the Pakistani government to move against Al Qaeda forces believed to have crossed the border—including, perhaps, bin Laden himself. Pressed to account for the light touch, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld explained that Pakistan is a "sovereign nation." But this sovereign nation won't even concede the existence of terrorists within its borders. "There can't be any such large-scale concentrations [of Al Qaeda] in any area of Pakistan," Pakistani General Javed Cheema declared last month. To underscore the point, Pakistan has released most of the 2,000 Islamic militants it imprisoned at Washington's behest earlier this year.

The administration has also been tiptoeing around Saudi Arabia—whose most visible response to 9/11 was to whisk its nationals out of the United States on a private plane. The Saudis, the president claimed last September, "have been nothing but cooperative." If so, that's only because the United States has declined to ask for their cooperation. Knowing the Saudis would refuse U.S. forces permission to launch attacks against Afghanistan, American bombers sat out the war at U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia. The Bush team has turned a blind eye, too, as the Saudis have held telethons for Palestinian suicide bombers, smooched Iraqi diplomats at Arab summits, and hampered Washington's pleas to shut down the bank accounts of Saudi terrorists. Indeed, just this week Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Kenneth Dam announced that the United States would rely less on "public designations of terrorists and terrorist supporters" when attempting to freeze suspect bank accounts overseas.

And what is true of the Bush team's approach to the core of the war on terrorism is also true of its approach to the war's periphery. Advertising its determination to track terrorists to the furthest corners of the globe, the administration announced in February that it was dispatching 1,200 U.S. troops to combat terrorists linked to Al Qaeda in the Philippines. But last week, when the time came for U.S. Special Forces to carry out their mission, a fear of American casualties prompted Rumsfeld to declare that he required "a greater comfort level" before sending them on combat patrols. Three days later Philippine forces fanned out into the jungle in their place—where they promptly botched an effort to rescue an American missionary couple, one of whom died.

So, yes, improve border controls. Foster interagency coordination. Open up suitcases. But it would be nice if someone—preferably someone at the White House—remembered that building walls won't eliminate terrorism. Eliminating terrorists will. ■

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NOTEBOOK

THE FACE OF EVIL: There are two things about the Daniel Pearl video that are unforgettably shocking. The first, of course, is the sight of his murder. Even as he looks into the camera and utters the statements that his captors demand that he utter—a confession of his Jewishness, followed by a confession of the sins of America—there is a good, genial look in his eyes, and a complete lack of despair in his voice; and then suddenly he is on the floor and a knife is passed along his throat and his severed head is raised by a hand in a white sleeve, and your heart breaks for this obviously lovely life destroyed in some low, godless corner of a deranged world. These are the images that a website called *prohosters.com* decided to keep online despite FBI demands that they remove them and that *The Boston Phoenix* controversially chose to link to. The images are, to put it mildly, tasteless; but surely there are times when truth is more important than taste. Why should Americans not see the actual savagery of some of our actual adversaries? The squeamishness of some critics of the video's distribution is certainly not owed to any mixed feelings about what it depicts, or about American policy in Muslim lands. No, it appears to be a more generalized squeamishness about the reality of the universe that the video shows: about the facticity of evil. This fear must be fiercely resisted, if we are to have clarity about the struggle in which we now find ourselves. For this reason, a viewing of this hideous video is as instructive an experience as it is a shattering one. But then there is the other shocking thing about this little snuff movie: *It is a commercial.* Pearl's doomed talking head is isolated within the blackened frame and surrounded by bubble-like images of the intifada. Moments before the tape's grisly climax there appears a photograph of Ariel Sharon and George W. Bush at the White House. There is a primitive soundtrack of thumps, sounding alternatively like drums or bombs. The anonymous executioner lifts his victim's head again and again, in a kind of triumphal refrain, and there appears an announcement that this has been brought to you by the National Movement for the Restoration of Pakistan Sovereignty. That obscure anti-American and anti-Semitic groupuscule then lists its demands, which include the release of the F-16s the United States has not yet delivered to Pakistan. The F-16s! So the images may be raw, but the footage is not raw: This is a political advertisement, pure and simple. It was produced and edited and titled the way advertisements are produced and edited and titled. Like all advertisements, it was designed to appeal to a particular audience. The assumption of the makers of this advertisement was that it will not inspire only horror, but also admiration. Once the genre of what you have seen begins to sink in, so does a sickening feeling of just how twisted is the environment in which these enemies of ours prosper. And what remains in the mind once the "credits" have rolled is not merely disgust, but also the conviction that the only right and proper response to this variety of anti-Americanism is American power.

THE MYSTERY OF THE MISSING CAVEATS, CONT'D: "I remember campaigning in Chicago, and one of the reporters said, 'Would you ever deficit spend?,'" reminisced President Bush last week. "I said, 'Only—only—in times of war, in times of economic insecurity as a result of a recession, or in times of national emergency.' Never did I dream we'd have a trifecta." Bush has repeated versions of this story time after time over the last several months; but as we've pointed out before, there's no reason to believe it actually happened. Last Sunday "Meet the Press" host Tim Russert told White House Budget Director Mitch Daniels that no one at NBC could find any evidence Bush had said this. "I'm not the White House librarian, so I haven't made a personal search myself," replied Daniels, "but I do know that I've heard the president



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say it privately and publicly, over and over, for a long time, as have scholars and theorists and supporters of balanced budgets, perhaps including Senator [Kent] Conrad." Even by the standards of Mitch Daniels, this is an astonishing piece of obfuscation. First, Daniels may not be the "White House librarian," but the White House does have researchers in its press office, who, despite repeated requests, have never produced any evidence to corroborate Bush's statement. Second, the fact that other supporters of balanced budgets have made this exception is irrelevant: The question is whether Bush made it, publicly, in Chicago—or anywhere else for that matter—during the campaign. And finally, if Daniels has heard Bush offer this caveat "publicly" and "for a long time," why can't he present just one example of Bush having done so during the campaign, as he says? The answer almost certainly is that he can't because it never happened. If the president won't admit he made this story up, will he at least stop repeating it?

IS BOB TORRICELLI ON DRUGS?: "Let the fight begin," New Jersey Senator Robert Torricelli declared last week after Douglas Forrester won the Republican primary to challenge him this November. And Torricelli came out swinging, savaging Forrester for his job as president of BeneCard Services Inc., a company that manages prescription-drug plans. Forrester, Torricelli argued, "takes hundreds of thousands of dollars from prescription-drug companies, and instead of using that money to lower the cost of prescription drugs, he keeps it for himself to become a multimillionaire." It's a fair line of attack, but not exactly the one you'd expect from the senior senator from New Jersey. Torricelli, after all, has been one of the pharmaceutical companies' staunchest allies on Capitol Hill. Most famously (or infamously), in 1999 Torricelli introduced legislation to allow Schering-Plough to seek a three-year extension of its patent for the popular allergy pill Claritin. Although the bill ultimately failed—and Schering-Plough's patent on Claritin will expire this year—it could have netted the pharmaceutical giant billions. Which is probably why, the day before Torricelli introduced the legislation, Schering-Plough gave $50,000 to the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, which Torricelli then headed. Forrester may wrest the title "Senator from New Jersey" away from Torricelli this fall, but the title "Senator from Claritin"—as Torricelli is called on the Hill—is safe and sound.

WHAT A DIFFERENCE A WEEK MAKES: "Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge said Thursday he would advise President Bush to veto any legislation creating a congressionally authorized Office of Homeland Security if Congress approves a bill this year.... Ridge's comments came as key members of Congress ramp up efforts to approve legislation that would create a full-fledged Cabinet-level position for homeland security."—*Govexec.com*, May 30

"White House officials say [Ridge] was a driving force behind [a Cabinet-level post], pushing for its development after meetings with department heads, members of Congress, state and local officials, private industry leaders, academics and former government officials."—*The Washington Post*, June 8 (Thanks to *talkingpointsmemo.com*.)



DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS: Due to a research error in last week's TRB, Boston was mistakenly identified as one of America's ten largest cities. While the metropolitan area ranks tenth, the city proper is twentieth. Also, the last name of a letter writer in our June 3 Correspondence section was misspelled as Reff. His name is, in fact, Jonathan Raff. We regret the errors. ■

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White House Watch

Big Deal

By Ryan Lizza

A few hours before President Bush's big speech last Thursday announcing what is shaping up to be the most ambitious attempt to expand the federal government since Hillarycare, the White House quietly released an amendment to an obscure, Clinton-era executive order. The White House deleted from the original order a phrase defining America's air-traffic-control system as "an inherently governmental function." In other words, it was the first step toward privatizing the work of some 20,000 air-traffic controllers (the guys Ronald Reagan famously fired his first year in office). The change follows up on some little-noticed language in Bush's budget this year hinting at the plan. And last Sunday, when White House Chief of Staff Andy Card was asked about the privatization proposal on ABC's "This Week," he implied the president was moving forward with the idea.

The timing of the air-traffic move was more than coincidental. It was a sign of the Bush administration's anxiety that conservatives will take the new Department of Homeland Security—coming as it does on the heels of several other high-profile expansions of government power—as proof positive that George W. Bush has abandoned his small-government principles. And in fact, that's exactly what it proves. Bush's proposal—probably the most important political decision of his second year in office—revealed three underappreciated truths about his presidency. And the first is that ever since September 11, Bush's limited-government instincts have been all but abandoned.

There is a doth-protest-too-much quality to the White House's claims that Bush's reorganization will decrease the size of government. A "Sample Op-Ed" distributed by the White House emphasizes, "There will be costs associated with the new Department—but there will also be savings. Redundant functions will be eliminated. Overhead costs will be reduced." When Budget Director Mitch Daniels was asked June 9 if the plan would increase spending, he said flatly, "No, we're going to use the same dollars that we're spending right now." He added that functions of the department would actually cost *less* over time than they do now. In the very first briefing on Bush's plan on June 6, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer adhered to the same script. "Just to be clear on that," he was asked by a reporter, "there will be no addition to the size of the federal government, the overall bureaucracy?" Fleischer responded, "That's correct.... That's why I said it's essentially budget-neutral. It's a reorganization."

But in the few days since the plan was unveiled, these iron-clad guarantees of zero budget growth have slowly given way to reality. When homeland czar Tom Ridge was asked last Sunday if the new department would cost more, he admitted, "Initially in transition, yes." Buried in the final pages of the report itself is language that grudgingly admits that the Bush plan creates new—currently unfunded—bureaucracies, such as a "threat analysis unit" to analyze intelligence from the FBI, CIA, NSA, and other sources. The report also acknowledges that "increased resources" and government "growth" may be necessary.

That wouldn't be a problem were Beltway conservatives not already fuming about a string of recent Bush betrayals—from campaign finance reform to steel tariffs to the bloated farm bill. Editorialists at *National Review* and the Cato Institute have assailed Bush's reorganization plan. And congressional Republicans worry that Bush won't keep the new department from growing bigger and bigger as it winds its way through Congress this summer. They conjure up Bush's acquiescence last year on the airline security bill: It was supposed to add 30,000 workers to the federal payroll; it may add close to 70,000. When Andy Card briefed congressional aides last Friday on the new Bush plan, an aide to Dick Armey—the House point man on the legislation—peppered him with questions about the new department's cost and size. Card conceded the plan would mean more federal workers.

Publicly, of course, GOP members are embracing Bush's plan. "I don't think Republicans are going to be eager to cross the president going into the elections," says one House leadership aide. But the new department is one more sign of a widening ideological gulf between Gingrichite libertarians—who opposed the airline security bill; fought key elements of the "Patriot Act" on civil liberties grounds; and pushed Bush (unsuccessfully) to submit a balanced budget—and national security hawks, who see the war as an opportunity to rid conservatism of its post-1994 green-eyeshade small-mindedness. Last week's announcement is the clearest evidence yet of where Bush falls.

The homeland security reorganization plan revealed something else about this White House: its penchant for centralizing power. Early in his presidency Bush bragged that he would devolve power out of the West Wing and into the hands of his Cabinet, which would act as a sort of board of directors. But no department heads were asked to join the clique of senior White House aides who planned the redesign. Cabinet secretaries didn't know about the plan until the last minute. For instance, Secretary of the Treasury Paul O'Neill, who stands to lose $5 billion worth of his department, wasn't informed until the day before Bush's speech.

The plan also suggests the growing clout of Card, previously one of the lowest-profile chiefs of staff in recent times, who basically seized the homeland office from Ridge and led the redesign. (It was Card, not Ridge, who decided the administration needed to completely rethink its homeland security structure.) In his now-infamous *Esquire* interview, Card said that with Karen Hughes gone, someone in the White House would have to wield more power in order to balance Karl Rove: That someone would seem to be him. And once again, Fleischer was out of the loop. "Creating a

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The Challenges of Charter Schools

Chester E. Finn Jr. is a distinguished visiting fellow, Hoover Institution; member, Hoover's Koret Task Force on K–12 Education; and president, Thomas B. Fordham Foundation.

Charter schools are now ten years old, and the movement is still spreading. About 2,400 charter schools have been operating in 2001–2002. A handful of cities now find 15–20 percent of their kids enrolled in charters. Yet **some of the wind is going out of the charter schools' sails.** Six challenges are paramount.

First, we see too little leadership in the charter movement. The concept of charter schools was dismissed at the last national education summit on October 9–10, 2001, in New York. The Bush White House rarely mentions charters. Few governors tarry long on this subject—and many admit to frustration over "bad apples" in the charter barrel. There's no coherent national voice explaining this reform idea to Congress, the media, or other educators.

Second, although not large, the bad-apple problem is easily exploited by critics. Most states have a few charters that never should have been allowed to start and a few more that cannot sustain the pace. What to do? Too many states—instead of promptly replacing hapless schools with better ones—are slowing the whole charter enterprise and putting bureaucrats in charge of it. Because the top concern of bureaucrats is to fend off future problems, the red tape piles up.

Third, even without added rules and regulations, it is hard to start a charter school. The *New York Times* recently recounted an unsuccessful three-year effort by would-be charter school founders in the South Bronx, whose dream of starting an arts-oriented charter was stymied by state and city bureaucrats, facility woes, and a lack of start-up funds.

Fourth, charter enemies are relentless. Their favorite strategies are to keep numerical caps in place on the grounds that "this risky experiment hasn't proven itself" while persuading policymakers (in the name of "ensuring accountability" or "leveling the playing field") that charters must be subject to ever more of the same requirements as regular public schools.

Fifth, charter advocates have not been smart enough about accountability, probably because they're split on the subject. We find libertarians insisting that the marketplace is a sufficient accountability mechanism; dyed-in-the-wool public educators being swayed by "level playing field" claims even though responding to such claims often brings stultifying red tape; and people resisting state standards and tests for the same reasons that other educators resist them.

Finally, **the charter movement itself cannot decide whether it is a trade association obliged to defend every school that wears the charter label or an education reform movement responsible for ensuring that only good schools are so labeled.**

These challenges are worth meeting. The promise of charter schools remains bright. The *National Journal*'s Jonathan Rauch recently profiled Nueva Esperanza Academy, a charter school serving Philadelphia's Latino community and one of as many as fifty such schools being developed by the National Council of La Raza. The academy is bringing low-income high school dropouts back into education. The school's name means "New Hope," which is how many charter advocates see their movement. But hope alone won't get it successfully through another ten years.

— Chester E. Finn Jr.

Paid for by the Hoover Institution, Stanford University



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Cabinet post doesn't solve anything," he lectured a couple of months before Bush asked Congress to create a Cabinet post. So were many Republicans on the Hill: Seven Republican senators on the Governmental Affairs Committee, acting as surrogates for an administration that publicly opposed a new department, noisily voted against such a bill just two weeks before Bush shifted course and embraced the idea. These same senators will be now be expected to reverse themselves and shepherd Bush's legislation through their committee.

Finally, the homeland security announcement has fed a growing Washington conventional wisdom that the Bush administration is at least as politically shameless as its predecessor. Critics immediately pointed out that although Bush announced his plan last Thursday—conveniently timed to step on whistle-blower Coleen Rowley's testimony about FBI bungling—the White House won't be ready to formally introduce it as legislation for several more weeks. The report the White House did put out is amateurish and lacking in detail compared with the thick, colorful proposals it usually favors. And by this Tuesday, Bush was in battleground state Missouri, standing before a huge backdrop bearing the phrase "PROTECTING THE HOMELAND."

The gambit worked. As *National Journal*'s Charlie Cook points out, immediately before the president's speech last Thursday, his Gallup approval rating had fallen to a post-9/11 low (a still-impressive 70 percent), and the number of people saying the country was going in the "right direction" was headed south. The first surveys taken after the speech show Bush's approval rating back in the high 70s and show concerns about pre-9/11 intelligence failures abating. In the longer run, however, the results may be more mixed. In the Beltway at least, a much more cynical view of Bush is taking shape—not just among Democrats, but among the press as well. When the administration revealed the alleged plan by Jose Padilla to detonate a dirty bomb this week, questions immediately turned to the timing of the revelation, since Padilla had been in custody for a month. *The New York Times* noted that many wondered whether it was "part of a pattern in which the administration orchestrated its announcements to help it politically." Next thing you know, cynics will be asking why the Bushies are suddenly so keen on privatizing air-traffic control. ■

On the Hill

Plan B

By MICHAEL CROWLEY

AT AN EARLY June meeting of Republican activists in California, White House political director Ken Mehlman set the stage for the November congressional elections. Delivering a slick PowerPoint presentation with 27 slides bearing short, declarative sentences and nifty national maps, Mehlman summarized the parties' competing approaches with boardroom efficiency. First he explained the by-now-familiar Democratic strategy: Support George W. Bush on the war, but "Attack on Domestic Agenda—Social Security, Health Care Costs, Environment, Education"; "Use Budget, Tax Cuts, and Enron for Class Warfare"; and "Divide [the] President and Congressional Republicans." Yet Mehlman predicted that the Democrats' strategy would fail. In a slide entitled "Mid-Term Political Landscape: More Favorable to Republicans," he ticked off several bullets points explaining why. "Extremely Popular President" was one; "Recovering Economy" another. But none was more important than this bit of understated corporatese: "Increased Importance of National Security Issues." And so when the slide entitled "Our 2002 Strategy" showed a bright red box with the words "Maintain a Positive Issue Environment," it didn't take a genius to figure out which issue Mehlman and his White House colleagues have in mind: terrorism.

The Bush administration may not be able to control exactly *what* Americans think about the terrorist threat, but they have enormous power to control *whether* they think about it. Fear-inspiring TV appearances by the likes of Vice President Dick Cheney and Attorney General John Ashcroft—as well as national addresses like the one Bush delivered last week—keep the words "Al Qaeda" on the front pages and in our collective anxiety attacks. And with the Democrats stuck in a defensive crouch, terrified of seeming like they are interfering with the war effort, that public attention almost always tilts the "issue environment" the GOP's way.

The congressional debate over Bush's proposed Department of Homeland Security promises more of the same. While some Democrats may nitpick, its approval will probably be an exercise in magnanimous, stately bipartisanship—the sort of thing that makes the David Broders of the world applaud. And since consideration of the proposed department could dominate public discussion virtually until Election Day, Democrats have two—unpalatable—choices. They can try to outdo Bush as homeland defense hawks, or they can keep trying to steer the campaign-trail debate away from the war and toward the "domestic issues" where they may have an edge. The first strategy hasn't worked so far; the second amounts to little more than an unproven hope.

DEMOCRATS BEGIN ANY national security debate at a serious disadvantage. The cold war left their military and foreign policy credibility in shambles, and the Bill Clinton years helped restore it only incrementally. Even though Democrats have been largely in lockstep with the president on the war since September 11, polls continue to show that, unlike him, they've reaped no real benefit. And while a few party leaders such as Senator Joe Lieberman may hope to outflank Bush on the right, mainly on the issue of Iraq, most are too dovish, or too insecure about their flimsy defense credentials, to join in.

The home front, however, has been a different story. Even as Bush has proposed billions in additional homeland

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security spending, Democrats have consistently outdone him—calling for billions more on everything from bioterror defenses to guarding nuclear material to inspecting cargo ships. For instance, after Bush asked for $4.7 billion in his first post-9/11 "domestic security" request last fall, House and Senate Democrats one-upped him. Proposing an extra $6.4 billion in the House and $7.5 billion in the Senate, they funded such seemingly unimpeachable priorities as an additional $191 million to secure Russian nuclear material; $200 million for bus and rail security; and $20 million for more training in foreign languages like Arabic, Farsi, and Pashto. (Republicans had sought no money for any of these categories.) Democrats also asked for $450 million in added security at U.S. nuclear weapons facilities; the White House and House Republicans ultimately agreed to less than one-third of that amount.

Now the same dynamic is playing out again. Last week the Senate approved an anti-terror spending bill that includes some $4 billion more in funding than the president wants. The White House, eager to look tough on spending to avoid criticism from small-government conservatives (see "Big Deal," by Ryan Lizza, page 10), has threatened a veto if the bill includes the Senate spending. So what exactly has the White House aligned itself against? More than $700 million for added port security and $100 million to fight nuclear proliferation—at a time when *The Sum of All Fears*, with its nuclear cataclysm in Baltimore Harbor, is the number-one movie in America. Hundreds of millions more would go to increased food safety and federal assessments of water-supply vulnerability. Even as Bush paid a camera-friendly visit to a Kansas City, Missouri, water-treatment facility this week to lend some imagery to his homeland security push, Senate Appropriations Chairman Robert Byrd was noting on the Senate floor that the White House has requested no money to secure water systems—despite testimony suggesting local governments need as much as $400 million to address the problem. (The Democratic bill about which Bush has been complaining offers a modest $125 million.) Bush's newfound frugality is especially curious, Democrats note, given that last month he signed a farm bill that increased agricultural subsidies by $70 billion.

DEMOCRATS LIKE SENATOR Tom Daschle have tentatively begun pressing this case against the administration. "[I]t seems to me, in light of the heightened tension and the heightened fear that there [is] as a result of these pronouncements, for us to be debating about whether or not we are going to spend additional amounts on homeland defense is, as I say, very troubling," the Democratic leader said last week. On Wednesday Wisconsin Democrat David Obey forced a House funding vote to show, as a press release from his office put it, "that the President's re-organization plan is no substitute for committing serious resources to homeland security." Some Democrats want to press their homeland-defense-hawk image even more aggressively—perhaps by tying Bush's resistance to new spending to the budget shortfalls created by his tax cut. The tax cut now "is a matter of national security," says Obey's spokesman, David Sirota. Bush is "literally choosing tax cuts over homeland security resources."

But for now the White House doesn't seem in danger of losing this fight. Most prominent Democrats still get ulcers when the tax cut comes up, as evidenced by their almost unanimous refusal to back a serious effort to freeze or repeal the Bush plan. And Senate Democrats stupidly allowed several absurd items of pork to creep into their anti-terror bill, including $11 million in assistance to New England fishermen and $26.8 million for a federal urban-mapping project. The White House has gleefully flogged those provisions and watched with delight as pork-buster Senator John McCain broke with his usual Democratic allies to rail against the bill. Several press accounts, in turn, have highlighted the charges of wasteful spending, despite its tiny proportion of the overall package. And so once again Democrats seem bound to earn little credit for their efforts.

SO DEMOCRATS GENERALLY agree that their best hope remains the bread-and-butter categories on Mehlman's PowerPoint slides. Which helps explain why House Democratic Leader Dick Gephardt is so eager to complete Bush's reorganization of the federal government not by the end of the year but by the symbolic date of September 11: He knows that every day spent talking about where to house the Coast Guard is one less day spent whipping up the Democratic base. Daschle began that effort this week, opening debate on a hate-crimes bill that has no chance of being passed into law this year but that means a lot to gays, lesbians, and African Americans in the party's base. Soon after, House and Senate Democrats finally took up the prescription-drug battle they have long been savoring.

Party optimists claim Democrats can win this fall even if Congress is focused on Bush's new department. Control of the House will likely be decided in rural areas where voters feel less anxiety about, say, dirty bombs than do most urbanites, and where the economy has been slowest to recover. "What the national media are focusing on is not what campaigns are about," says a House Democratic leadership aide. "Prescription drugs doesn't go away because of this. People care about things even when they're not on the front page of *The Washington Post*." Senate battles, with their broader terrain, are more influenced by national issues. But in a state like Maine, where Republican incumbent Senator Susan Collins is staving off a challenge from Democrat Chellie Pingree, prescription drugs is issue number one. In South Carolina, where Democrat Alex Sanders is trying to overtake Representative Lindsey Graham for Strom Thurmond's seat, a non-war-related brouhaha over federal storage of nuclear waste in the state is a defining issue. And although South Dakota Senator Tim Johnson's patriotism has been shamelessly questioned by his Republican challenger, John Thune, farm spending probably looms larger in that race than does Osama bin Laden. Even Mehlman's presentation acknowledged that "control of Congress will turn on [a] handful of races decided by local issues, candidate quality, money raised, campaign performance, etc." Spoken almost like a hopeful Democrat. ■

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Why fingerprinting won't work.

Finger Tip

By Noam Scheiber

On its face, Attorney General John Ashcroft's plan, announced last week, to fingerprint about 100,000 foreigners visiting the United States each year sounds prudent. Since "fingerprints don't lie," as Ashcroft recently put it, fingerprinting visitors from Arab and Muslim nations should be a reliable way of identifying terrorists who would otherwise quickly disappear inside the country. In fact, until recently even liberals endorsed this logic. When Ashcroft informed a House subcommittee this February that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had already "found a number of hits of people trying to come in . . . that we have pulled out of the line, and they have their fingerprints examined," Rhode Island Representative Patrick Kennedy called the idea "super," adding, "I think it's essential."

Of course, now that Ashcroft is turning this erstwhile pilot project into federal policy, most liberals are decidedly less keen. "[W]hat impact do you think these policies will have on the Arab and Muslim communities in the U.S. if you're holding job fairs in the morning and fingerprinting them in the afternoon?" Kennedy's father, Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy, complained at a hearing last week. But the real problem isn't that Ted Kennedy is right this time around. Any infringement on civil liberties would likely be marginal: None of the candidates for fingerprinting would be American citizens or permanent residents, and many would come from countries on the State Department's terrorism list—visitors the law technically requires to be fingerprinted already. The real problem is that Patrick Kennedy was wrong in February. For all its intuitive appeal, fingerprinting probably won't stop determined terrorists from crossing the border.

Under Ashcroft's plan, visitors traveling to the United States on foreign visas would be profiled according to certain characteristics (presumably gender, age, country of origin, etc.) and pulled aside at their point of entry (airport, seaport, or border crossing) for fingerprinting. While they wait, these fingerprints would be checked against various databases related to possible terrorist intent. Ashcroft envisions three specific ways of using the prints: running them through a "database of thousands of known terrorists"; running them through a "database of wanted criminals"; and adding them to existing databases in hopes of preventing would-be terrorists from reentering the country under different identities.

The first sounds like the most obvious—a simple matter of inputting fingerprints into a computer to determine whether or not they belong to a terrorist. Alas, Ashcroft's database of "known terrorists" does not, in any meaningful sense, exist. While it's true that American intelligence officials have dusted Al Qaeda training camps for fingerprints—and that these prints have since been catalogued—America's months-long bombing campaign and the notorious Afghan winter probably damaged those prints' legibility. As Peter Higgins, a former program director for the FBI's fingerprint database, notes, fingerprints exposed to fire or precipitation are "not likely to be very useful." Beyond that the pickings are slimmer still. Just about the only other places to get fingerprints for at-large terrorists are the sites of terrorist attacks. But here, too, the prints are mostly smudged, damaged, or partial. "If you go to places like the Khobar Towers bombing," explains former State Department counterterrorism official Larry Johnson, "there aren't a lot of prints to pick up there." Moreover, given the popularity of suicide attacks, many of the terrorists whose prints might be found are dead—unlikely candidates for a repeat offense. So it's not surprising that when asked just how many terrorist fingerprints he had, Ashcroft quickly backed off his claim of "thousands" and conceded, "I'm not sure exactly how many."

Of course, even if the database contained only a hundred prints, it would still be a good idea to keep these would-be terrorists out of the country. The problem is that, as a sheer statistical proposition, there's little chance of scoring a match between this limited number of prints and the 100,000 foreign visitors Ashcroft plans to fingerprint each year. That's especially true given that the Justice Department will only print two fingers—the index finger of each hand—per person. If those two fingerprints don't happen to be among the ones the FBI has collected, the fingerprintee will sail through customs even if he's technically in the database.

Given the weakness of Ashcroft's database of terrorist prints, it seems logical that visitors' prints will also be matched against two, much larger criminal databases—the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), and the INS's "IDENT" system, both of which include both index fingers. Indeed, the "1,400 wanted criminals" Ashcroft claims to have arrested during the recent five-months-long pilot project come courtesy of the prints in these databases.

Unfortunately, while those 1,400 people make for an impressive law enforcement statistic, they leave much to be desired as a counterterrorism statistic. That's because IAFIS and IDENT are databases of conventional criminals and illegal aliens, not terrorist suspects. Anyone arrested anywhere in the country for a serious misdemeanor or felony—from firecracker-smuggling to murder—shows up in IAFIS, which, to date, "enrolls" about 44 million people. Likewise, the roughly two million sets of fingerprints in IDENT include anyone who's been deported for committing a crime or who's been caught entering the country illegally—the vast majority of whom cross the border from Mexico. The result, according to former CIA Counterterrorism Chief Vince Cannistraro, is that there's basically "zero" overlap between the profile of the average IAFIS and IDENT criminal and the profile of the average terrorist, who is not likely to have a criminal record outside his terrorist acts.

It's the final pillar, however—creating a new database of

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prints to prevent foreign visitors from reentering the country under different identities—that is perhaps the least promising of all. Just consider the chain of events necessary to produce a positive identification. First the person would have to get a visa and enter the country legally, at which time he would be fingerprinted. Then that person would have to leave the country and, for whatever reason, not be able to obtain a visa the second time around, causing him to apply for a visa using fake or stolen identification. Finally, if he's one of the lucky few who gets fingerprinted a second time, we nab him when it turns out his fingerprints match the name he traveled under previously and not the one he's traveling under now.

Such a chain of events is pretty difficult to imagine. For one thing, people who can get a visa the first time around—whether under their real identity or an assumed one—are likely to be able to get a second one under the same identity. More importantly, many visas are valid for multiple entries to the United States. So even if someone entered the country on a temporary visa and then left and committed a crime, making it difficult to get a second one, in many cases he wouldn't have to. (Khalid al Midhar, the alleged suicide pilot of American Airlines Flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon, reentered the country in July 2001 on just such a visa.)

But all of this may be trivial given the fact that once they're inside the country nobody plotting a terrorist act ever has to leave in the first place. After all, the only thing compelling an otherwise law-abiding terrorist to leave is the expiration of his visa. But since the INS doesn't even keep track of which visas expire when—it estimates the total number of expired visas, but nothing more—why would anyone worried about being admitted into the country risk leaving? If the history of Islamist terrorism in the United States is any indication, they wouldn't. The four 9/11 hijackers illegally in this country at the time of the attack had entered legally but simply overstayed their time limits.

Does this mean the Justice Department's fingerprinting efforts couldn't possibly do any good? Of course not. There's always a chance we'll stumble onto someone who just wasn't thinking. Given that possibility, many wonder what the harm is in trying. But the question isn't whether fingerprinting would work at *all*; it's whether the return on fingerprinting would exceed the return on other counterterrorism measures. And the answer is a clear no.

The INS estimates it will spend $200 million just on integrating its fingerprint database with the FBI's—a job that is still far from complete. By the time you install the necessary hardware and trained personnel at every port of entry in the country—there are over 300 of them—the costs will likely run into the billions. Compare the limited return on that with other, no more costly measures likely to have a far greater impact—such as figuring out who has overstayed their visa. As Steve Camarota, research director for the Center for Immigration Studies, points out, "Wal-Mart scans a product when it comes in and when it leaves.... There's no technological impediment to tracking people [the same way]." This could entail something as innocuous as embedding a bar code in each visa and scanning it into a database upon entry and departure.



Still easier (and considerably cheaper) would be simply to change the rules for issuing visas—and enforcing the ones that exist. According to *U.S. News & World Report*, three of the 9/11 hijackers took advantage of a program called "Visa Express," meaning they obtained visas without being interviewed by consular officials. Another conspirator, the so-called twentieth hijacker Zacarias Moussaoui, used a visa-waiver program that allows French citizens, among others, to circumvent the process altogether. Doing away with these programs could do far more to stop terrorists from entering the country than even the most successful fingerprinting initiative.

So could training consular officials to enforce Section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allows them to reject (nonimmigrant) visa candidates who lack compelling reasons to return to their countries of origin: wives and children, jobs, property, etc. The more of these characteristics a person meets, the less likely it is they'll turn out to be a suicide bomber. Conversely, it's probably not a coincidence that three of the 9/11 hijackers were young, unmarried, and cash-strapped; a fourth,

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Mohammed Atta, was unmarried and unemployed. As Camarota argues in a recent report, it's tough to see how they'd have been granted visas had 214(b) actually been applied.

And if after doing all this the Justice Department is still intent on fingerprinting, the right way to do it isn't at points of entry once terrorists have already obtained their visas. It's at consulates, where there's still a real chance of rejecting them. One of the worst-kept secrets among consular officials is that someone denied a visa at one consulate can simply change his identity and reapply at another—and so on until he finally succeeds. But if visa applicants were fingerprinted, a terrorist would be out of the visa game the first time he got rejected. That may not be as dramatic as "pulling people out of line" at an airport. On the other hand, it just might work. ■

San Francisco Dispatch

West Bank

By Karen Alexander

Isaac Goldstein enrolled at San Francisco State University (SFSU) in part to get away from the anti-Semitism he experienced in the small Northern California town of St. Helena. "I got called a dirty Jew all the time and harassed," says Goldstein, who was one of only three Jews in his high school class of about 120 students. "I thought San Francisco was a liberal, open-minded city and people would accept all kinds of thought."

It hasn't quite turned out that way. As the Middle East crisis has heated up this spring, Jewish students at SFSU and across the bay at the University of California, Berkeley, have spent the better part of their spring semester enduring a barrage of hateful invective. In April a flyer advertising a pro-Palestinian rally at SFSU featured a picture of a dead baby, with the words "CANNED PALESTINIAN CHILDREN MEAT—SLAUGHTERED ACCORDING TO JEWISH RITES UNDER AMERICAN LICENSE"—casually reintroducing the 900-year-old myth that Jews eat gentile children. Then, on Passover, a cinder block was thrown through the glass doors of UC Berkeley's Hillel building. One week later two Orthodox Jews were badly beaten one block from the UC Berkeley campus, and anti-Zionist graffiti appeared on sidewalks and buildings near the school. During a vigil for Holocaust Remembrance Day on April 9, students reciting the Mourner's Kaddish—the Jewish prayer for the dead—were shouted down by protesters who said prayers in memory of suicide bombers.

The rash of incidents culminated on May 7 when approximately 30 Jewish students at SFSU, cleaning up after a peaceful, university-authorized, pro-Israel demonstration, were surrounded by at least twice as many pro-Palestinian students who screamed, "Hitler didn't finish the job," "Fuck the Jews," and "Die, racist pigs." (At least one person was caught on videotape hurling anti-Palestinian epithets back.) University and city police formed a barrier, and the Jewish students were trapped for more than 20 minutes before police funneled them out of the plaza. "I felt very threatened," recalls Yitzhak Santis, director of Middle East Affairs for the Jewish Community Relations Council in San Francisco, who attended the rally and was present when the counterdemonstrators closed in. "I'm convinced that if the police had not been present there would have been violence."

When it comes to the treatment of Jews on campus, in other words, Isaac Goldstein didn't choose well. Pro-Palestinian activism certainly isn't confined to SFSU and UC Berkeley. But on most campuses the protesters—while often hyperbolic—have been careful to avoid explicit anti-Semitism and threats of violence. When students at Harvard and MIT circulated a petition calling on their universities to divest from companies doing business with Israel, for instance, they were careful to call "the recent attacks on Israeli citizens unacceptable and abhorrent." But in the Bay Area anti-Israel activism has a far more militant and far less liberal flavor. That's not because UC Berkeley and SFSU have unusually large or radical Arab populations; it's because they are home to a deep wellspring of free-floating, hard-left authoritarianism. And unfortunately for Goldstein, today's left-wing authoritarians have set their sights on Israel.

Bay Area campuses have enjoyed a reputation for activism since the 1960s, when Mario Savio started the Free Speech Movement at UC Berkeley and student militants at SFSU successfully pushed for one of the nation's first ethnic-studies programs. But in recent years the protests at both schools have grown increasingly strident. In April 1999 dozens of members of a pro-ethnic-studies organization called the Third World Liberation Front took over a campus building at UC Berkeley, resulting in 103 arrests. When six of the students charged with the most serious crimes—such as assault on a police officer—went on trial a few months later, Third World Liberation Front members took over the courtroom, resulting in 25 more arrests. And it hasn't just been the ethnic-studies movement. Last March pro-affirmative-action demonstrators at UC Berkeley rioted and looted downtown stores. Even Bay Area bicycle activists have gotten into the act, staging "Reclaim the Tarmac" actions—like dumping pieces of furniture in the middle of city roads—to "tak[e] back the streets from automobiles and their corporate sponsors." As UC Berkeley philosophy Professor John Searle—who in the '60s became the first tenured faculty member to back the Free Speech Movement—lamented to *The San Francisco Examiner* on the movement's thirtieth anniversary, "The saddest thing was that it gave a whole lot of people a model of political life which is totally unrealistic. They wanted to keep sitting in buildings and then finding that policies change."

So it's hardly surprising that pro-Palestinian activism—the latest cause to sweep Bay Area campuses—has also tested the limits of civility. Of the nearly 27,000 students enrolled at SFSU, there are only 50 to 60 Palestinians, estimates Fadi Shamieh, a student organizer of the General Union of Palestinian Students. UC Berkeley, which boasts a student body of

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31,000, has fewer than 1,200 students of Arab descent. But Arab students have found eager allies among the Bay Area's preexisting, off-campus lefty groups. The pro-Palestinian organization at UC Berkeley, for instance, receives assistance from Left Turn (a Socialist group), the Revolutionary Communist Party, and the International Socialists Organization (ISO). The pro-Palestinian camp at SFSU also benefits from such outside help. "I don't know their background or their history," SFSU Palestinian activist Shamieh says of his ISO allies, "but all I know is they support us in anything we do." Even Berkeley's city council has plunged into the fray: A sizable minority of its members recently—and unsuccessfully—pushed resolutions to boycott Israel and to call on the district attorney to drop the investigation of the 79 pro-Palestinian activists who took over a UC Berkeley classroom building during midterm exams on Holocaust Remembrance Day.

THE HARD LEFT has given pro-Palestinian groups in the Bay Area an unusual capacity to turn out large crowds. "At every one of our pro-Palestinian rallies we outnumber the other side, sometimes by as much as six or seven to one," says Snehal Shingavi, a UC Berkeley graduate-student instructor who gained notoriety earlier this year for offering a class entitled "The Politics and Poetics of Palestinian Resistance," warning in the course catalogue, "Conservative thinkers are encouraged to seek other sections." (The line was later removed.) "Many people [at the rallies]," Shingavi goes on, "tell me they knew nothing about Israel before the last year." And along with the increased numbers has come increased stridency. "When people are taking to the streets, it tends to attract people from the fringes and makes it a little hard to control," says Jonathan Bernstein, the Anti-Defamation League's San Francisco regional director. "People latch on with their own issues, and I don't think there's been much effort to put parameters around [the movement]." Indeed, California has become something of a magnet for anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic figures from across the country. In recent months supporters of David Duke have distributed flyers railing against "Israeli genocide" on the University of California, San Diego, campus; at Stanford, Lyndon LaRouche adherents have handed out literature condemning Israeli oppression; and Holocaust denier Bradley R. Smith recently ran an op-ed in the UC Berkeley student newspaper condemning the "ethnic cleansing" of Palestinians.

Pro-Palestinian student leaders say they reject some of the more outlandish views of their supporters. The head of the Muslim Students' Association at SFSU, in a qualified apology to the university president, placed blame for the April "blood libel" flyer on nonstudents despite the fact that the poster was advertising an event sponsored by his group. "Please understand that the flier was actually designed by a nonstudent community member," the student leader wrote. "We in no way intended nor desired to have this obviously offensive and injurious phrase on our flier." But Jewish students complain that the apology was never sent to any of the Jewish groups on campus. And when SFSU President Robert A. Corrigan condemned what he called "[a] small but terribly destructive number of pro-Palestinian demonstrators, many of whom were not SFSU students," for "abandon[ing] themselves to intimidating behavior and statements too hate-filled to repeat," pro-Palestinian activists from both SFSU and UC Berkeley held a joint press conference to denounce Corrigan for "capitalizing on the atmosphere of fear and fostering intolerance against Arabs and Muslims on campus."

The irony is that if the pro-Palestinian demonstrators weren't so belligerent, they might find common ground with the Jewish students they're attacking. As opposed to Eastern campuses—where many Jewish students take neoconservative, almost Likudnik stances on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—Jewish students in the Bay Area tend to be on the far left of the American-Jewish political spectrum. Laurie Zoloth, director of the Jewish Studies program at SFSU, explains, "The Jewish students here are absolutely people who stand in the peace camp. These are students who have steadfastly called for a two-state solution and tried desperately to work with the pro-Palestinian groups.... But at San Francisco State to say that I believe in a two-state solution and the right of Israel to exist becomes a right-wing position." Says Goldstein, "It has become politically incorrect among the left to show support for Israel, and that scares me because I really don't want to become a Republican. I really don't." In the Bay Area, he might not have a choice. ■

Islamabad Dispatch

Trigger Happy

By ERIC WEINER

FEW AMERICANS HAVE heard of Abdul Qadeer Khan, but in Pakistan he is a household name, a national hero of Elvis proportions. A street in Islamabad bears his name. His image appears on the back of brightly painted trucks. Schoolchildren and retirees alike sing his praises. No, Khan is not a cricket player or a movie star or even a politician. He is a nuclear scientist: the father of Pakistan's bomb.

South Asia's war clouds may be dissipating, but Khan's glory is not only intact; it's stronger than ever. Many Pakistanis believe it is Khan's handiwork—several dozen nuclear warheads that he developed between 1975 and 1998, when Pakistan tested its first bomb—that now seems to have saved their country from annihilation. And across the border, India's nuclear superstar, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam (like Khan, a Muslim), is also being showered with accolades: The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) this week nominated him for president, a mostly ceremonial position, but it's not bad for a septuagenarian scientist who writes poetry in his spare time.

The West might like to believe that the recent showdown over Kashmir has shaken India and Pakistan out of their nuclear daydream. It has not; if anything, it has had the

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opposite effect. India believes it was its nuclear threat, combined with the world's post-September 11 intolerance of terrorism, that last week forced Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf to finally rein in the jihadis—the Islamist militants who have caused so much grief in Kashmir. For its part, Pakistan is convinced that, without the bomb, India would have attacked—as it did several times in South Asia's pre-nuclear age. In other words, leaders of both countries seem to have drawn the same lesson from last month's crisis: Deterrence works. Meanwhile, they are racing to build bigger bombs carried on longer-range missiles. It's not exactly the cooling-down period the world was hoping for.

One of the few dissenters from Pakistan's love affair with the bomb is Pervez Hoodbhoy, an MIT-educated nuclear physicist and peace activist. "We may be able to periodically ride out crises," he recently told me, "but at some point it is going to come to a stop. You are either going to get nuked, or you are going to nuke somebody." But Hoodbhoy is a lonely voice. Being an anti-nuclear activist in South Asia these days is like being a pack-a-day smoker in the United States: At best, you are tolerated as an eccentric out of step with the times; at worst, you are seen as a danger to society. Hoodbhoy is tolerated—but just barely. His documentary on the dangers of nuclear war has been shown on television in Canada and Japan but not in Pakistan.

Most Pakistanis dismiss Hoodbhoy as an alarmist. If deterrence worked for the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war, they argue, why won't it work in South Asia? Maybe it will, but there are key differences between the cold war and the hot war currently being waged on the subcontinent. For one thing, the United States and the Soviet Union never drew blood on the battlefield—at least not directly. India and Pakistan, by contrast, have fought three bloody wars. And since an Indian invasion could quickly put its army on the outskirts of some of Pakistan's biggest cities, Islamabad might deem a nuclear response necessary to ensure its national survival—something neither Russia nor the United States ever had to contemplate. Secondly, Washington and Moscow were separated by thousands of miles. Pakistan and India share a long border, along which local feuds like that over Kashmir can set off larger hostilities. The shorter distances also allow for less reaction time, and India and Pakistan have yet to install the safeguards that helped keep the cold war cold. There is no hot line, for instance, between New Delhi and Islamabad. Finally, the two countries share a deep, venomous hatred, the kind only sibling rivalries seem to engender. A half-million people died during Partition, when the British carved up their South Asian empire into India and Pakistan. Muslims and Hindus slaughtered each other back then, and they still do today: In the past few months religious mob violence has taken at least 1,000 lives in the Indian state of Gujarat. Cold war animosities, while intense, do not compare.

But despite these dangers, few South Asians question the wisdom of possessing nuclear weapons. Why? Because nuclear weapons offer a fast track to international prestige and respect; they command the world's attention in a way that AIDS or poverty or, for that matter, conventional weapons simply do not. Would Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld have jetted halfway around the world if Pakistan and India were threatening each other merely with tanks? India and Pakistan are now on the map, and they have the bomb to thank. Shortly after the May 1998 nuclear tests, Indian commentator Chandan Mitra put it this way: "[T]he bomb is a currency of self-esteem."

South Asia's nuclear-tipped self-esteem is on display everywhere. When the two nations tested nuclear bombs in 1998, people on both sides of the border danced in the streets, swept up in the euphoria of the moment. In Pakistan religious parties printed T-shirts that boasted of the world's "first Islamic bomb." Even the names of the missiles that carry these weapons are laden with meaning. Pakistan's medium-range Ghauri missile, for instance, is named after a twelfth-century Afghan warlord who waged two fierce battles against the Hindu rulers of northern India. He was defeated in the first battle, but he later returned with a bigger army and trounced the Hindus.

When it comes to nuclear weapons, South Asians display an odd mix of bravado and ignorance. They love the bomb yet know little of its destructive power. Many people I spoke with believe a nuclear bomb is exactly like a conventional bomb, only a bit bigger. The Indian and Pakistani governments seem content to keep their citizens in the dark about the terrifying realities of nuclear war. They rarely hold civil-defense drills; offer no pamphlets on radioactive contamination; and, in Pakistan at least, prevent the broadcast of anti-nuclear materials like Hoodbhoy's documentary. And so it's not surprising that ordinary Indians and Pakistanis rode out this latest crisis while hardly missing a beat. While the world fretted about the prospect of nuclear Armageddon, people in Islamabad quietly went about their business, more concerned about the arrival of the summer monsoon than about finding the nearest fallout shelter. (There aren't any.) Unlike Americans during the height of the cold war, South Asians don't even pretend to prepare for nuclear war. Islamabad's civil-defense budget is a whopping $40,000, and it has yet to be allocated this year.

"Part of me feels grateful that most people here don't have any notion of the horrors of nuclear war," the Indian novelist Arundhati Roy wrote in an essay published this week in the Pakistani newspaper *Dawn*. "And yet it is this ignorance that makes nuclear weapons so much more dangerous. It is this ignorance that makes 'deterrence' a terrible joke." Certainly, there is no turning back. As the United States discovered decades ago, once the nuclear genie is out of the bottle it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to put it back. But the United States has attained a certain level of, for lack of a better term, nuclear maturity that India and Pakistan have yet to reach. And while the United States and Russia are reducing their nuclear arsenals, India and Pakistan are heading in the opposite direction. So far they have been lucky. The world can only hope that during the next crisis—and there will be a next crisis—their luck holds. ■

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Can Europe survive German nationalism?

Domestic Threat

By JOHN B. JUDIS

BERLIN, GERMANY

OVER THE PAST few months Americans have awakened to the right-wing, anti-immigrant nationalism growing across Europe. On April 21, far-right presidential candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen garnered a shocking second place in the first round of French elections. Barely two weeks later Dutch anti-immigrant leader Pim Fortuyn was assassinated; in elections nine days after that, his party joined the Christian Democrats (CDA) in ousting Holland's long-standing Labor government. From Joerg Haider's Freedom Party in Austria to Denmark's People's Party to Belgium's Vlaams Blok, anti-immigrant racism is on the rise in a half-dozen European countries—often fusing with hostility to the European Union's (EU) proposed eastward expansion and, indeed, to the European Union itself. And yet this ugly populism does not fundamentally threaten the half-century-long project of European integration and the liberal politics upon which it is based. And it will not—unless it gains a foothold in Germany.

Germany is Europe's indispensable nation. It is not only the continent's wealthiest and most populous country, but for a half-century it has consistently deployed its strength in the service of a united, peaceful, prosperous Europe. Germany's first postwar chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, joined with France in 1958 to form the European Economic Community, which Adenauer and his successors saw not merely as an engine of economic recovery but as a supranational bulwark against Germany's toxic nationalist past. In 1978 German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing launched the European Monetary System, the predecessor to the euro. And in 1990, after Germany reunified, Chancellor Helmut Kohl began pushing to enlarge the European Union eastward—a project he believed would entrench democracy in the lands of the former Soviet bloc and prevent a revival of the bloody ethnic hostilities that have plagued the region for centuries.

Underlying this altruistic foreign policy has been Germany's remarkably non-nationalist, even anti-nationalist, domestic political environment. Although Germany has suffered its share of anti-immigrant street violence, its political elites—associating strident nationalism with the country's dark history—have for decades successfully kept it from infecting public debate. But that may be changing. Germany, which in the 1980s was considered on the verge of displacing the United States as the world's most powerful economy, has endured a decade of sluggish growth and high unemployment—with little evidence that the situation will improve anytime soon. "Once the greatest economy in Europe, Germany is no longer a locomotive for Europe and the world," wrote economic consultant Roland Berger in a recent issue of *Die Zeit*. "It cannot even fulfill the expectations of its own citizens—whether young or old." And that economic failure has begun to eat away at the foundations of Germany's political consensus, stirring up historic anxieties that prosperity had long suppressed. For the first time in decades this year's election campaign has seen Germany's political establishment pander to public resentment of immigrants; one of the major parties has even flirted with anti-Semitism. And mainstream politicians are beginning to acknowledge the public's growing displeasure with European integration. If these trends continue, they could destroy hopes of EU expansion, which would dramatically undermine efforts to build a peaceful, liberal order in Eastern Europe. They could even lead to a politically embittering and economically destabilizing process of deintegration in the West. Says Roland Freudenstein, deputy director of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (the think tank of the Christian Democrats, or CDU), "Europe can live with a Haider. But the day a German Le Pen or Haider gets fifteen percent, the EU is in trouble."

Germany's economic decline began in the early '90s in large part because of the exorbitant costs that reunification with the East entailed. To make reunification as attractive as possible to the East, Kohl swapped the worthless East German currency one-for-one with German deutsche marks. His government also poured money into the East's decrepit state industries in a losing effort to keep them afloat and granted East Germany's 16 million citizens the same generous welfare and unemployment benefits as citizens of the West.

But Kohl's assumption that private capital would flood eastward and eventually equalize the two regions did not come to pass. Instead, the East, with its poorly trained and unmotivated workforce, repelled rather than attracted investors. Within four years East Germany had lost 3.7 million jobs, and unemployment in the region had risen to nearly 20 percent. Today much of the East German countryside looks like the American Rust Belt of the early '80s, with boarded-up factories and storefronts and an absence of aspiring young people, many of whom have fled West. In the '90s the German government pumped about a trillion dollars into the East, and it continues to send about $70 billion there annually—4.5 percent of West Germany's GDP—diverting

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money from the country's troubled educational system and raising costs for employers, who must subsidize the additional welfare and Social Security payments to the East.

To make matters worse, Western Germany has been unable to make a post-cold-war transformation of its own. It remains burdened by labor regulations and work rules that were appropriate to a classic industrial economy but are blocking its transition to a knowledge-based post-industrial one. Like Japan (another nation that cherished the stability of lifetime employment), Germany is having difficulty adapting to what Joseph Schumpeter called "creative destruction"—the chaotic, entrepreneurial culture of "spin-offs" and "start-ups" that has formed the basis of post-industrial booms in the United States, Great Britain, and Ireland.

For starters, German companies find it almost impossible to fire or lay off workers. German work councils can demand that employers provide up to two years of severance pay for laid-off workers, and fired workers can force employers to prove in court that their dismissal was justified. The government also imposes strict rules on part-time and temporary workers, including a requirement that part-time workers enjoy exactly the same benefits as full-time workers. These restrictions, along with draconian limits on how long retail stores can stay open, have inhibited the growth of a labor-intensive service sector. The service sector accounts for only 38 percent of employment in Germany, compared with 81 percent in the United States. And that ratio has contributed significantly to rising unemployment. As Berger notes, the prevalence of capital-intensive manufacturing industries and the absence of labor-intensive services means that in order to create new jobs the German economy has to grow 2.4 percent annually, compared with just .5 percent annually in the United States.

Many Germans, including Social Democratic (SPD) Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, understand they face a structural economic crisis that, in the absence of extensive legal and political reforms, could last well into the new century. During Schroeder's 1998 campaign he promised economic reform and soon after taking office vowed to follow Tony Blair's "third way" model. Last year a Schroeder-appointed commission blamed Germany's stagnation on restrictive labor regulations that "protect the core workforce but limit how permeable the employment system is, leading to a segmentation of the labor market, that discriminates against the young and against women, and increases the risk of long-term unemployment." But despite his campaign promises, Schroeder has not acted on this diagnosis. Though he has cut punitive taxes on corporate mergers and ousted left-wing Finance Minister Oskar LaFontaine (who wanted corporate tax increases), Schroeder has not merely failed to reduce labor regulations; he actually got the Bundestag to adopt legislation that makes it *more* difficult for German companies to hire low-wage workers or lay off redundant ones. Tobias Dürr, the editor of *Berliner Republik*, a magazine that advocates a "third way" for Social Democrats, quips, "We tell people we're Tony Blair, but we're still Neil Kinnock"—Blair's unsuccessful, old-left predecessor as Labour Party leader.

And there is little reason to believe that if Schroeder's SPD is defeated this September by the CDU and its Bavarian-based subsidiary, the Christian Social Union (CSU), his successor will act differently. The CDU/CSU's nominee for chancellor, Edmund Stoiber, is promising to reform labor regulations. But while the CDU and CSU have traditionally been more conservative than the Social Democrats on issues like abortion and immigration, they have been largely indistinguishable when it comes to the economy. The CDU, for instance, is responsible for Germany's 1951 Codetermination law that grants unions seats on corporate boards, and this year it has criticized Schroeder for cutting corporate taxes. As the Munich-based governor of Bavaria, Stoiber was known for subsidizing both new and failing industries and for working closely with labor. Asked recently whether he would alter Schroeder's strategy of working out economic policy through an alliance of business, labor, and government, Stoiber demurred.

Moreover, Stoiber—like Schroeder—is fully committed to Germany's welfare state. The CDU/CSU platform calls for *more* social spending. And Stoiber will not brook criticism of Germany's generous unemployment-benefits system. This spring, for example, Stefan Effenberg, the former team captain of Munich's soccer team, said in an interview with the German edition of *Playboy* that "a lot of the unemployed have such good benefits that they don't want to get up in the morning and do a full day's work." After union leaders complained to the team's management, Effenberg's coach suspended him on the eve of two key games—under pressure



CHRISTOPHE VORLET

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from union officials and team board member Stoiber. "Mr. Effenberg should stick to talking about what he knows best: football," Stoiber said.

If neither the SPD nor the CDU/CSU is championing economic reforms, it is largely because the political obstacles to doing so are profound. The labor movement, which is dedicated to blocking reform, boasts a membership of more than 40 percent of German workers. Germany's poor and working class vote in high numbers; and they regularly punish politicians who advocate limits on welfare spending or a reduction in labor regulations. In East Germany the CDU and SPD justifiably fear that if they advocate a reduction in government subsidies, the region's alienated voters will back the former Communists of the Party for Democratic Socialism.

In short, Germany, like Japan, is trapped in a paralyzing network of political obstacles and economic arrangements. In Japan the result has been a bipolar spiral of manic hope in would-be reformers, followed by depression and disillusionment when they predictably fail. In Germany the response may be more worrying still: a new nationalism. And that nationalism is beginning to transform public debate over two central issues to German politics—immigration and Europe.

UNTIL RECENTLY GERMANY had a simple strategy for ensuring that immigration did not become a pressing political issue: Unlike France or the United Kingdom, Germany segregated its immigrants economically, socially, and legally. They were discouraged from becoming citizens. They didn't constitute a voting bloc. They took jobs that German citizens didn't want. And they lived by themselves in urban ghettos, like Berlin's Kreuzberg district—dubbed "Little Istanbul"—or on the outskirts of Hamburg. But the decline of the German economy, combined with the post-9/11 specter of foreign terrorism, has raised the visibility of Germany's immigrants and threatened to make immigration—for the first time—a major issue in this fall's campaign.

West Germany's post-World War II immigration laws were similar to the ones passed in Wilhelmine Germany and left in place through the Nazi era. In essence, West German citizenship was automatically granted to anyone of German culture and descent who was living within Germany's boundaries in 1937. This included East Germans, as well those Germans subsequently scattered throughout Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, West Germany passed legislation granting "guest worker" status to Turks, Italians, and other immigrants to work temporarily in Germany's car assembly lines, farms, construction sites, sanitation services, and food-processing and textile plants. They were not encouraged to become citizens but, rather, to return home after several years. Yet, even after the guest-worker program was abolished in 1973, Germany's immigrant population continued to grow—swollen by asylum seekers and refugees from the Middle East, Africa, and the former Yugoslavia and by family members of guest workers who remained in the country. By the end of the '90s Germany boasted about 7.5 million foreign-born residents—more than any other European country and on par proportionately with the United States.

But rather than assimilate and eventually become citizens, immigrants to West Germany were aggressively segregated. Many immigrant children were taught in "national classes" separate from German students. Immigrants had to wait 15 years to apply for naturalization and even then had difficulty qualifying. By the mid-'80s, even though about three million immigrants were eligible for citizenship, only about 14,000 were getting it per year. Even children born in Germany did not automatically qualify as citizens: In 1998 a Munich court deported a 14-year-old Turkish petty criminal—even though he had been born and lived only in Germany and could not speak Turkish.

BY THE LATE-'90S Germany was facing an immigration crisis. On the one hand, German business leaders looked enviously at the United States, which attracted skilled computer programmers, engineers, doctors, and nurses from overseas—a kind of immigration that in Germany was forbidden. On the other hand, Germany's existing, largely unskilled immigrant population was suffering inordinately from the country's economic decline—in particular, from restrictions on the growth of a service economy. (Whereas in the United States unskilled immigrants can climb up the occupational ladder by working multiple jobs in small 24-hour stores and shops, in Germany this kind of piecemeal, after-hours work is forbidden.) Immigrants began swelling the welfare rolls, and crime rates in immigrant communities began rising, especially in big cities like Hamburg.

As a result, Germany has found itself buffeted between business demands for a new law encouraging immigration and growing public resentment toward immigrants, who are increasingly blamed for rising welfare expenditures and crime rates. Last September 23, voters in Hamburg registered their unhappiness in an election for the city-state's government. A new "Law and Order Party," led by Judge Ronald Schill—who had threatened to deport Africans who could not produce identity cards—took 20 percent of the vote, ultimately forming a coalition government with the CDU, with Schill himself as Interior Minister (see "Cell Block," by Richard Miniter, TNR, December 24, 2001). Schill, who has continued to rail about "imported unemployment and imported crime," has not decided whether his party will field candidates in the fall election; but in current national polls his party garners an impressive 11 percent.

And there is at least the opportunity for Schill's party—or one like it—to grow beyond that. In a poll published last month by the German daily *Handelsblatt*, 54 percent of respondents thought most of the nation's immigrants were not interested in assimilating; 43 percent thought foreigners were more disposed to being violent than Germans. Only 12 percent favored increased immigration. Richard Stoess, a professor of political sociology at the Free University of Berlin, calculates from his own polling that there is now a 12 percent to 15 percent latent vote for someone like Le Pen or Haider. It is disproportionately concentrated in the former Communist East. It is primarily male, lower class, and fueled by what Stoess calls "relative discontent" with a person's economic condition and sympathy for "nationalism,

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authoritarianism, racism, nostalgia about the Nazi regime, and anti-Semitism." To date, these sentiments haven't cohered into a national political movement. One reason, according to Stoess, is that Germany doesn't yet "have an attractive right-wing party. If we had Fortuyn or Le Pen, they would vote for them." Another is that for decades the major parties have effectively stigmatized anyone who expresses racist or right-wing nationalist attitudes. At least until now.

AFTER TAKING OFFICE in 1998 Schroeder's red-green coalition of the SPD and the Greens proposed not only welcoming new skilled immigrants but also—largely at the urging of the Greens—integrating existing immigrants by improving their schooling and making it easier for them to become citizens. Though some Christian Democrats balked, a watered-down reform bill was passed in 1999. With this year's election approaching, however, the CDU/CSU is attacking those reforms for undermining Germany's blood-based view of citizenship. And while the reason appears to be sheer opportunism—"There was very little difference in social policy. That is why we grabbed immigration," explains one prominent CDUer—the voicing of this racial appeal by a mainstream German party could prove a political watershed.

At the party's meeting in May 2001 the CDU declared that Germany "is not a classic country of immigration, and because of its history, geography, and economic conditions, it cannot be one." The party further demanded that all foreigners adhere to "the values of our Christian culture"—a demand, in effect, that Germany's Muslim Turks, Bosnians, and North Africans abandon their own culture and religion. Last September the CDU welcomed Schill and his party into its governing coalition in Hamburg; in January the CDU/CSU chose Stoiber as its candidate for chancellor over the more socially moderate Angela Merkel—ensuring that immigration would be an important issue this fall. Stoiber has a history of opposing the integration of immigrants into German society. Last year he warned of Germany being "swamped" by immigrants. This year he defied his own business backers by opposing Schroeder's plan for encouraging skilled immigration, claiming that it would create "multicultural parallel societies." Arguing that the answer to Germany's lack of skilled workers was not immigration but a higher native birth rate, he proposed paying German families to have more children. As Jurgen Ruttgers, a CDU candidate in North Rhine Westphalia, put it in 1999, "*Kinder statt Inder*"—"Children not Indians."

But perhaps the most striking evidence that the post-World War II political consensus against courting intolerance and bigotry is eroding comes from a controversy over Israel and anti-Semitism involving the leadership of the Free Democratic Party (FDP). From 1969 until it was replaced by the Greens in 1998, the FDP, a libertarian, pro-business party, served as either the SDP's or the CDU's coalition partner in government. But now, with the Greens suffering from a lack of a credible economic program, the FDP appears poised to reenter government as junior partner once again. This spring the party's deputy chairman, Jurgen Mollemann—a former Kohl Cabinet member—recruited into the FDP a prominent Syrian-born German, Jamal Karsli, who had quit the Greens after they threatened him with expulsion for his anti-Israel views. Installed by Mollemann in the FDP's Parliamentary Group, Karsli attacked the Israelis for their "Nazi methods"—a shocking reference in Germany—and granted an interview to an extreme right-wing publication, *Junge Freiheit*, in which he criticized Germany's "Zionist lobby."

Mollemann not only refused to dissociate himself from Karsli; he stoked the flames by expressing public sympathy for Palestinian violence. When Germany's Jewish leaders—including TV talk-show host Michel Friedman, the vice president of Germany's Central Council of Jews—criticized him, he responded harshly, accusing his detractors of *promoting* anti-Semitism by promiscuously leveling the charge at Israel's critics. Haider, who had similarly baited Austria's Jewish leaders, applauded Mollemann's tactics. FDP leaders, who initially stayed silent, finally began to distance themselves from Mollemann late last month after SPD and CDU officials began suggesting that his remarks could render the FDP an unfit coalition partner.

But the cruel irony is that while the controversy swirled, the FDP's national poll ratings rose. According to Freudenstein, CDU internal polls showed the FDP's support rising from 10 percent to 11 percent or 12 percent of the electorate. In a June 6 poll in *Der Stern*, 30 percent of Germans backed Mollemann's position and only 22 percent backed Friedman's. And according to Freudenstein and other observers, Mollemann's support extends beyond older Easterners to the same young, upwardly mobile, middle-class voters who have supported Haider in Austria and Fortuyn in the Netherlands. As in those countries, there is a considerable reservoir of public resentment against the perceived "political correctness" of political elites—a political correctness that in Germany is felt most strongly on issues concerning Jews and Israel. Together with the economically discontented hard right, these younger voters could constitute a formidable bloc of support for a German Haider, one considerably larger than the 11 percent of the population that currently backs Schill.

IF MORE MAINSTREAM politicians follow Schill and Mollemann's example of stoking ethnic resentment and right-wing nationalism for political gain, the implications will be felt not merely in Germany but across Europe. In a sense, after all, it is precisely German "political correctness"—its leaders' inhibitions about the pursuit of narrow and exclusionary national self-interest—that has made Europe what it is today.

France hatched the idea of European integration in the '50s largely as a means of neutralizing German power; and, in a sense, Germany went along—endorsing a supranational structure meant in part to ensure that it couldn't wield its economic and political muscle to the detriment of its neighbors. To this day German leaders still argue that the European Union is necessary to prevent Europe from reverting to its history of war, which is partly a coded way of saying the European Union is necessary to protect Europe from Germany. As Kohl put it in 1996, "European unification is in

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reality a question of war and peace in the twenty-first century." Current Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, who has succeeded Kohl as Germany's most articulate pro-Europe spokesman, argues that if the European Union does not expand, the virulent ethnic nationalism that devastated the Balkans could break out once again—not only in Eastern Europe but eventually in the West as well. In a famous speech at Humboldt University in January 2000, Fischer warned that "a divided system of states in Europe without an overarching order would in the long term make Europe a continent of uncertainty, and in the medium term these traditional lines of conflict would shift from Eastern Europe into the EU again."

GERMAN BANKERS AND business leaders also consider political integration the best way—perhaps the only way—for the continent to prosper economically. Integration, they argue, not only gives Europe its own reserve currency (the euro), but it makes possible the creation of large pan-European companies with the capital to compete with American multinationals. If Europe fails to truly integrate economically, German leaders have warned, it could find itself in the same situation as Latin America—divided among rival currencies, with the weakest nation's currency jeopardizing the strongest's.

In recent years, as enthusiasm for the European Union has waned among French voters (who barely approved the euro in 1992) and among their leaders (who harshly criticized Fischer's plans for a new Europe), the push for Eastern expansion has depended more and more on German political support. But today there is growing evidence that the political support—powered by a self-consciously post-nationalist German elite insulated from public pressure—is starting to deteriorate.

Until recently German leaders kept questions about the European Union out of public debate—refusing to hold a referendum on adopting the euro as Denmark and France did. And the German public went along. Devastated by the Nazi experience and by defeat in World War II, postwar Germans initially ignored foreign policy; and as the country grew prosperous and gained prestige as a world power, the country's altruism seemed to be paying political dividends. In the '80s, for instance, Germany backed the entrance of Spain, Portugal, and Greece into the European Union, even though it meant subsidizing their economies for decades. The issue wasn't even politically controversial. But the painful experience of reunification and its attendant costs have altered that calculation. Polls taken regularly by the European Union—dubbed the "Eurobarometer"—detected a decline in German support for EU institutions declined during the '90s as the economy began to falter. Germans currently rank at the bottom of the 15 EU countries for "pride in being European." They are twelfth of 15 in whether they think their country benefits from EU membership. They are fourteenth of 15 in their trust in EU institutions, ahead only of the United Kingdom.

And the European Union's potential expansion—which would allow Eastern Europeans and their goods unfettered access to Germany—is bringing together public opposition to immigration and public suspicion of European integration. According to the Eurobarometer, Germans are thirteenth of 15 in their support for EU enlargement (only Austria and France are more opposed). According to polling by Stoess, Germans worry that if the European Union is enlarged eastward, Poles will flood into their country and take their jobs and Polish farms will undermine their German counterparts (even though the opposite is far more likely). "Germans think nationalistically," says Stoess. "They accept the EU, but they are not happy to be in it."

Germany's business leaders, who covet Eastern European markets and labor, are finding it increasingly difficult to prevent Germany's politicians from pandering to the public's anti-Europe mood. Two years ago Stoiber declared his reservations about EU enlargement and called for a public referendum. In response, the pro-business *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* attacked him for "playing with the fire of euro-skepticism" and for taking positions that could "have disastrous consequences for Europe and for Germany." Stoiber has since quieted his criticism of EU enlargement, but one close backer believes that after the election he "will block low-wage workers" from coming into Germany.

That could spell trouble for Germany and Europe. Germany needs markets to the East, and its aging population needs replenishment from young immigrants. And if a renewed spirit of German nationalism were to turn the continent's leading advocate of a United States of Europe against the effort, other European countries would almost certainly respond in kind—potentially deintegrating the European Union, spawning despair and alienation in the East, and fueling beggar-thy-neighbor economics and ethnic extremism across the continent.

MODERATE CDU MEMBERS like Freudenstein believe that even if Stoiber wins, it's unlikely German business will allow him to oppose immigration or EU enlargement. (Freudenstein also believes that if the CDU/CSU forms a governing coalition with the FDP, it will not accept Mollemann as a Cabinet member.) But regardless of its outcome, September's election is unlikely to do anything to solve the underlying trends fueling German nationalism and xenophobia—in particular, Germany's ongoing economic decline. If joblessness hovers around 10 percent, Germans will continue to blame immigrants for rising crime and welfare expenditures and continue to fret about Poles taking their jobs.

If unemployment stays that high for several more years, Germany could easily follow the path already taken by Austria, Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, France, Belgium, and Italy—countries where right-wing nationalist movements have substantially eroded political support for a unified Europe. And if that happens, it will make this spring's panic over Le Pen look like a sideshow. Rising extremism in Copenhagen or Vienna or even in Paris is a European problem, not a European crisis. But what happens over the next decade in Berlin may well determine Europe's fate in this new century. ■

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Stanley Kauffmann on Films

Truth and Inconsequences

IN THE AUGUST 9, 1922 issue of this magazine, Frances Taylor Patterson wrote: "In a day of emotional and artistic deliquescence on the screen, a picture with the fresh strength and pictorial promise of *Nanook of the North* is in the nature of Revelation." The screen has recurrently deliquesced since then, and once again comes a film from the north to remind us of that fact by its revelation of strength. Robert J. Flaherty's *Nanook* has reigned since 1922 as the best film about Inuit life: now it is joined and in some ways surpassed by Zacharias Kunuk's **The Fast Runner** (Lot 47).

Kunuk was born in a sod house in the Arctic in 1957 and since the age of nine has lived in Igloolik on Baffin Island. Apparently it was in Canadian cities that he studied film-making. His cinematographer, Norman Cohn, has been living in Igloolik since 1985 and has worked with Kunuk on numerous documentaries. All the cast of *The Fast Runner* are Inuit. Some of them have had acting experience, most have not. This mixture is not a rarity in film-making: most of the cast in Laurent Cantet's *Time Out* were not professionals. But Cantet's pros did not have to come back, as Kunuk's pros did, to immerse themselves in a relatively primitive manner of life.

Nanook was and still is visually stunning because of its incredible expanses of snowy nothingness. *The Fast Runner*, as it begins, almost seems to be picking up this subject with a long shot of a fur-clad man and two dogs surrounded by white immensity. Cohn's cinematography is in color, done with a digital camera: the footage was later transferred to usual stock. Of course the color is a huge asset in itself—which of us, outside of Rockwell Kent, knew that there were so many degrees and tints of white?—but Cohn uses it with a fine sense of relevance. He wants to show us that northern light works wonders in sky and terrain. (In summer, the white is replaced by brown.) Most engaging is Cohn's sculptural use of light on the blunt yet varied Inuit faces.

Nanook is a documentary, and Flaherty was chided for some arrangements that he made. (He built an oversize igloo without a roof so that he could shoot interior scenes. I wondered about the igloo interiors in this new film.) *The Fast Runner* is a drama, based on an old Inuit legend, which, in brief, deals with the rivalry of two young men for a young woman. One of them, Atanarjuat (the fast runner), wins her hand. One spring night he and his brother are sleeping in their tent when they are attacked by the defeated rival and two other men from his tribe. The brother is killed. Atanarjuat then flees naked across the brown terrain, the ponds, the patches of ice and snow, pursued by the three who want to kill him. The chase is long, but Atanarjuat survives, and his survival leads to resolution of tribal troubles.

The performances of all the roles are better than we might have expected. Sincerity pulses throughout, the assurance from these people that they are enacting a legend that is significant to them. Characterizations are hardly complex, but probably anything more nuanced would have been inconsistent with the general level of conversation, action, decision, all of which are portrayed in figurative primary colors. Family feeling, that most precious of universals, is yet again the foundation of being.

With the stratospheric difference between Inuit lives and ours, it is inevitable that we view this film in some aspects as a travelogue: the way the Inuit fill their seal oil lamps; the way they cook (or don't cook) their food—has any Inuit ever eaten a vegetable?; their comfort as members of small groups, six or eight, in the middle of cosmic space. Kunuk concentrates so wholeheartedly on the story, he is so smitten with love for his people and for their legend, that we are affected as much by his feelings as by the film. He convinces us that, for an Inuit, an Inuit life is complete, even to mime and song and dance. (Their culture includes the tattooing of women's faces.) Kunuk's prime accomplishment is that he actually made this film, that it now exists. It is one hundred seventy-two minutes long, and possibly the early section could be a bit condensed, but it is a not-too-modest epic.

Years ago I showed *Nanook of the North* in a film course, and after this account of courage against natural obstacles had concluded, one young woman in the class said appreciatively, "Nobody ever sends care packages to the Inuit. No one needs to. They're OK." Wherever that young woman is now, I hope that she gets a chance to see *The Fast Runner*.

Well, back to civilization—and nuclear threats. When political thrillers began to be plotted on a global scale—was there ever a James Bond villain who didn't want to capture the whole world?—they generally eluded the destruction of "life as we know it" at the last shaved second. With *Fail-Safe* and *Dr. Strangelove*, both in 1964, the stories spilled over the edge of doom, but that's where they ended. Now comes **The Sum of All Fears** (Paramount), in which the story continues after catastrophe. Oh, it's not complete catastrophe: only Baltimore is destroyed by a nuclear explosion, and a U.S. aircraft is blown up in the North Sea, and some ICBMs hit Moscow. Still, the picture ends with the American president and the Russian president sitting down in the Rose Garden to sign a peace pact. The camera then descends just outside the garden to find the hero and the heroine celebrating their engagement.

The film is based on a Tom Clancy novel, with the usual hero, Jack Ryan, a CIA operative who is also a learned historian. Clancy and his chief are trying to track an Israeli atomic bomb that has been missing since 1967. It was a dud and is now exhumed in a Middle Eastern desert by black marketeers, then makes its way through nefarious hands to a persistent Nazi who will use it against the United States. The CIA fumbles the trail of the bomb. Some comment on this film has deplored it as ill-advised in these edgy days because of the way the CIA is treated, but the whole plot is so ridiculous that it has to make the real-life CIA look better.

Ryan is played by Ben Affleck, that amiable young man who seems to have bet his friends that he could play a part in a movie, and, by golly, he is doing it. Morgan Freeman, as his chief, has one more in a long line of parts that are straitjackets for his formerly infectious talent. Liev Schreiber, recently a Hamlet in New York, plays a CIA hit man, a role that could have used any one of ten thousand inferior actors.

In this Bush-Ashcroft age, we do not especially need more strictures on civil liberties, but after this despicable film perhaps the great minds of Movieland could be persuaded to agree on a ground rule: films about nuclear terror must not be risible, and they must show the results of a nuclear bombing as something more than a couple's engagement kiss. ■

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The economics and the education of suicide bombers.

Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?

By ALAN B. KRUEGER *and* JITKA MALEČKOVÁ

I.

THAT INVESTMENT IN education is critical for economic growth, improved health, and social progress is beyond question. That poverty is a scourge that the international aid community and industrialized countries should work to eradicate is also beyond question. There is also no doubt that terrorism is a scourge of the contemporary world. What is less clear, however, is whether poverty and low education are root causes of terrorism.

In the aftermath of the tragic events of September 11, several prominent observers and policymakers have called for increased aid and educational assistance as a means for ending terrorism. "We fight against poverty," President George W. Bush has declared, "because hope is an answer to terror." But a careful review of the evidence provides little reason for optimism that a reduction in poverty or an increase in educational attainment would, by themselves, meaningfully reduce international terrorism. Any connection between poverty, education, and terrorism is indirect, complicated, and probably quite weak. Instead of viewing terrorism as a direct response to low market opportunities or lack of education, we suggest it is more accurately viewed as a response to political conditions and long-standing feelings of indignity and frustration (perceived or real) that have little to do with economics.

An understanding of the causes of terrorism is essential if an effective strategy is to be crafted to combat it. Drawing a false and unjustified connection between poverty and terrorism is potentially quite dangerous, as the international aid community may lose interest in providing support to developing nations when the imminent threat of terrorism recedes, much as support for development waned in the aftermath of the Cold War; and connecting foreign aid with terrorism risks the possibility of humiliating many people in less developed countries, who are implicitly told that they receive aid only to prevent them from committing acts of terror. Moreover, premising foreign aid on the threat of terrorism could create perverse incentives in which some groups are induced to engage in terrorism to increase their prospects of receiving aid. In our view, alleviating poverty is reason enough to pressure economically advanced countries to provide more aid than they are currently giving. Falsely connecting terrorism to poverty serves only to deflect attention from the real roots of terrorism.

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TO MAKE ANY headway investigating the determinants of terrorism, one must have a working definition of terrorism. This is a notoriously difficult task. More than one hundred diplomatic and scholarly definitions of the term exist. The types of activities by various groups that are considered terrorist acts differ substantially across the definitions. The term "terrorism" has also evolved over time. It was first used in a political context during the French Revolution, when it was reserved for accusations against those who, like Robespierre, made use of violence in the name of the state. By the late nineteenth century, however, Russian and French anarchists proudly used the word "terrorism" to describe their violent endeavors against the state. A part of the difficulty in defining terrorism is that there are valid disputes as to which party is a legitimate government. During World War II, for example, the German occupation forces labeled members of the French Resistance terrorists.

A range of possible definitions exists. The State Department, which acknowledges that no single definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance, seems to have captured what is considered terrorism by many governments and international organizations. Since 1983, it has employed this definition for statistical and analytical purposes: "The term 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. The term 'international terrorism' means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country." The State Department also specifies that "the term noncombatant is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty.... We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings against U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf, Europe, or elsewhere." The rub, of course, is that the definitions of "subnational" and "military hostilities" leaves much latitude for disagreement.

The definitions of terrorism used by scholars, by contrast, tend to place more emphasis on the intention of terrorists to cause fear and terror among a targeted population that is considerably larger than the actual victims of their attacks, and to influence the views of that larger audience. The actual victim of the violence is thus not the main target of the terrorist act. Scholarly definitions often also include nation-states as potential perpetrators of terrorism.

RATHER THAN DOGMATICALLY adhere to one definition, we have analyzed involvement in or support for activities that, at least when judged by some parties, constitute terrorism. Still, in the incidents that we have analyzed, the line between terrorism and resistance is often blurred. At the least, all of the cases we examine could be thought of as involving politically motivated violence. Moreover, it is reassuring that our main conclusions appear to hold across a varying set of circumstances, cultures, and countries. (We do not examine state terrorism because we suspect that the process underlying participation in state terrorism is quite different from the process underlying sub-state terrorism, and would involve a different type of analysis. We do not dispute that state terrorism exists, and that it has at times generated sub-state terrorism as a response.)

In economics, it is natural to analyze

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participation in terrorism in the framework of occupational choice. As is conventional in economics, involvement in terrorism is viewed as a rational decision, depending on the benefits, costs, and risks involved in engagement in terrorism compared with other activities. Not surprisingly, the standard rational-choice framework does not yield an unambiguous answer to the question of whether higher income and more education would reduce participation in terrorism.

In this context, we have also reviewed evidence on "hate crimes," which can be viewed as a close cousin to terrorism in that the target of an offense is selected because of his or her group identity, not because of his or her individual behavior, and because the effect of both is to wreak terror in a greater number of people than those directly affected by the violence. A consensus is emerging in the social science literature that the incidence of hate crimes, such as lynchings of African Americans or violence against Turks in Germany, bears little relation to economic conditions.

Most significantly, we have considered data from a public-opinion poll conducted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR). In December 2001, Palestinians were asked whether they supported attacks on Israeli civilian and military targets, and about whether they considered certain incidents acts of terrorism. Breaking down the data by education and occupation indicates that support for violence against Israeli targets is widespread in the Palestinian population, and at least as great among those with higher education and higher living standards as it is among the unemployed and the illiterate. Similarly, a review of the incidence of major terrorist acts over time in Israel, and an analysis that relates the number of terrorist acts each year to the rate of economic growth in that year or in the recent past, yields the same skepticism about the idea that poverty is a cause of terrorism.

The data on participation in and support for political violence, militancy, and terrorism that we have examined are meager, often indirect, and possibly nonrepresentative. In addition, participation in terrorist activities may be highly context-specific, and we have examined terrorism, militancy, and politically motivated violence in a small number of settings primarily in the Middle East. Consequently, our results must be considered tentative and exploratory. Yet we are not aware of compelling evidence that points in the opposite direction from what we have found. In light of our results, we would urge intellectuals and policymakers to exercise caution in presuming that poverty and education have a direct and causal impact on terrorism.

II.

A SIMPLE VIEW of terrorism is that participation in terrorism is akin to participation in crime in general. Economists have a well-developed and empirically successful theory of participation in criminal activities. As emphasized by Gary Becker, individuals should choose to allocate their time between working in the legal job market or working in criminal activities in such a way that maximizes their utility. After accounting for the risk of being caught and penalized, the size of the penalty, and any stigma or moral distress associated with involvement in crime, those who receive higher income from criminal activities would choose involvement in crime. According to this model, crime increases as one's market wage falls relative to the rewards associated with crime, and decreases if the risk of being apprehended after committing a crime, or the penalty for being convicted of a crime, rises. Available evidence suggests that individuals are more likely to commit property crimes if they have lower wages or less education; but the occurrence of violent crimes, including murders, is typically found to be unrelated to economic opportunities.

Some economists, notably William Landes, Todd Sandler, and Walter Enders, have applied the economic model of crime to transnational terrorism. They focus on how an increase in penalties and law enforcement influences the incentive to partake in terrorist activities. But the economic model yields few concrete predictions insofar as the relationship between market opportunities and participation in terrorism is concerned, because participation in terrorist acts by individuals with different characteristics depends on the probability that participation will bring about the desired political change, as well as the differential payoff for the various groups associated with achieving the terrorists' desired aims versus the penalties associated with failure. It is possible, for example, that well-educated individuals will disproportionately participate in terrorist groups if they think that they will assume leadership positions if they succeed, or if they identify more strongly with the goals of the terrorist organization than less-educated individuals.

Other important considerations include the relative pay of skilled and unskilled individuals for participation in terrorist organizations and how it compares to relative pay in the legal sector, and the selection of particular terrorists by terrorist organizations. Bill Keller recently reported in *The New York Times* that Iraq decided in March to increase the payment to families of suicide bombers in the West Bank and Gaza from $10,000 to $25,000. In the month after that decision, suicide bombings increased, though it is unclear whether the connection is causal.

EVEN BEFORE THE increase in the payment to families of suicide bombers, there was a large supply of willing suicide bombers, as Nasra Hassan, a relief worker for the United Nations, reported last year in *The New Yorker*. Between 1996 and 1999, Hassan interviewed nearly two hundred fifty militants and associates of militants involved in the Palestinian cause, including failed suicide bombers, the families of deceased bombers, and those who trained and prepared suicide bombers for their missions. One Hamas leader whom Hassan interviewed remarked: "Our biggest problem is the hordes of young men who beat on our doors, clamoring to be sent [on suicide missions]. It is difficult to select only a few." A senior member of the al-Qassam Brigades said: "The selection process is complicated by the fact that so many wish to embark on this journey of honor. When one is selected, countless others are disappointed." Thus, the demand side is also part of the equation.

With a queue of willing participants, how do terrorist or militant groups choose their suicide bombers? A planner for Islamic Jihad explained to Hassan that his group scrutinizes the motives of a potential bomber to be sure that the individual is committed to carrying out the task. Now, a high level of educational attainment is probably a signal of one's commitment to a cause, as well as of one's ability to prepare for an assignment and carry it out. For this reason, the stereotype of suicide bombers being drawn from the ranks of those who are so impoverished that they have nothing to live for may be wildly incorrect. This interpretation is also consistent with another of Hassan's observations about suicide bombers: "None of them were uneducated, desperately poor, simple-minded, or depressed. Many were middle class and, unless they were fugitives, held paying jobs. More than half of them were refugees from what is now Israel. Two were the sons of millionaires."

Suicide bombers clearly are not motivated by the prospect of their own individual economic gain, although it is possible that the promise of larger payments to their families may increase the willingness of some to participate in these lethal missions. We suspect their primary motivation instead results from their passionate support for the ideas and the aims of

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their movement. "Over and over," Hassan reported, "I heard them say, 'The Israelis humiliate us. They occupy our land and deny our history.'" The eradication of poverty and the attainment of universal high school education are unlikely to change these feelings. Indeed, it is even possible that those who are well-off and well-educated experience such feelings more acutely.

ECONOMIC THEORY IS unlikely to give a very convincing answer one way or the other as to whether poverty and education are important root causes of terrorism. One could construct plausible explanations for why a reduction in poverty and a rise in education might increase or decrease the incidence of terrorism. It might help to consider the evidence on hate crimes. Since the literature on participation in terrorism is less well developed than the literature on hate crimes, we begin by briefly reviewing evidence on the economic determinants of hate crimes, a phenomenon that many have considered closely related to terrorism.

Hate crimes are commonly defined as crimes against members of religious, racial, or ethnic groups because of their group membership, rather than because of their characteristics or actions as individuals. Hate crimes include acts of violence as well as destruction of property, harassment, and trespassing. Until recently, social scientists thought that economic deprivation was a crucial determinant of hate crimes, but new evidence strongly challenges the empirical basis for this conclusion. In fact, a new consensus is emerging that views hate crimes as independent of economic deprivation.

The original empirical support for the economic deprivation hypothesis stemmed mainly from historical evidence on anti-black lynchings in the southern United States. In his classic book *The Tragedy of Lynching*, which appeared in 1933, Arthur Raper documented a correlation of -0.532 between the number of lynchings in a year and the value of an acre of cotton (a measure of economic conditions) in that year, using data from 1882 to 1930. He concluded that "periods of relative prosperity bring reduction in lynching and periods of depression cause an increase." In 1940, the psychologists Carl Hovland and Robert Sears seized on this finding as support for the view that intergroup antagonism results from frustration accompanying economic contractions.

But a landmark study by Donald Green, Jack Glaser, and Andrew Rich overturned that conclusion in 1998. First, they showed that the correlation between lynchings and economic conditions vanished once secular trends in both variables were taken into account. That is, apart from the long-term tendency for the number of lynchings to decline and the economy to grow, lynchings were unrelated to year-to-year economic fluctuations. Second, when they applied Simon Kuznets's measure of real per capita GNP growth (which was unavailable to Raper) as a measure of economic conditions instead of the value of cotton, they found that lynchings and economic conditions were virtually unrelated.

Raper's sample ended just before the Great Depression. Lynchings did not rise during the Great Depression, despite the dramatic deterioration in economic conditions. When Green, Glaser, and Rich extended the original sample through 1938, they found an insignificant correlation between the number of anti-black lynchings and the value of an acre of cotton, and a positive correlation between anti-black lynchings and real GNP growth. It is almost certainly the case that the inverse correlation reported between economic conditions and anti-black lynchings that launched the "aggression-frustration hypothesis" was spurious, a coincidence of two unrelated trends that happened to move in opposite directions at the turn of the twentieth century.

Moreover, evidence of a connection

"My name will survive as long as man survives, because I am writing the greatest diary that has ever been written. I intend to surpass Pepys as a diarist."

When John Knox wrote these words, he was in the middle of law school, and his diary had already reached 750 pages. His chronicles might have landed in an attic had he not secured a position after graduation as law clerk to Justice James C. McReynolds—arguably one of the most disagreeable justices to ever sit on the Supreme Court—during the year that FDR attempted to pack the court. Knox's diary paints an extraordinary portrait of the Supreme Court, Washington DC, and a cast of characters stretching from kitchens to the White House.



"This book has novelistic force, like *One L* or *The Paper Chase*. It's about a weird quartet: the author, who is a nice young man, a bit of the obtuse narrator; his boss, McReynolds, a kind of legal Bluebeard; and the two black servants, who call McReynolds (behind his back of course) 'Pussywillow.' This is literature, rather than just history—the charm is in the telling."

Judge Richard A. Posner

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between economic conditions and other types of hate crimes in contemporary data is elusive as well. Green, Glaser, and Rich also report evidence on the incidence of hate crimes against blacks, Jews, Asians, and homosexuals using data from New York City each month from 1987 to 1995. They found that the incidence of these crimes was unrelated to the city's unemployment rate. And across regions in a given year, the occurrence of hate crimes and the prevalence of hate groups are also found to be unrelated to the economic circumstances of the area. In a study of the "geography of hate," Philip Jefferson and Frederic L. Pryor examined determinants of the existence of hate groups across counties in the United States in 1997. (About 10 percent of counties, they noted, are home to a hate group.) They found that the location of hate groups was unrelated to the unemployment rate, divorce rate, percentage of blacks, or gap in per capita income between whites and blacks in the county. The share of the adult population with a high school diploma or higher had a statistically significant positive association with the likelihood that a hate group was located in the area. They concluded that "economic or sociological explanations for the existence of hate groups in an area are far less important than adventitious circumstances due to history and particular conditions."

THE FINDINGS FOR the United States do not appear to be unique. Germany experienced a rash of violence against foreigners in the early 1990s. Unemployment was high, particularly in the former East Germany. But economists who have studied the German case found no relationship between the unemployment rate and the incidence of ethnic violence across 543 counties in Germany, once they took account of whether the county was located in the former East or West Germany. Likewise, average education and the average manufacturing wage in the county was unrelated to the amount of violence against foreigners. Within the former East Germany, those counties located farthest from the West had the highest incidence of ethnic violence, a geographical pattern that may be explained by a failure of law enforcement farther east and a pent-up animosity that was suppressed during communism.

In sum: neither cyclical downturns nor longer-term regional disparities in living standards appear to be correlated with the incidence of a wide range of hate crimes. This is not proof of the absence of a causal relationship, of course; but if there were a direct causal effect one would expect hate crimes to rise during periods of economic hardship. Rather than to economic conditions, the hate crimes literature points to a breakdown in law enforcement, as well as official sanctioning and encouragement of civil disobedience, as significant causes of the occurrence of hate crimes.

III.

THE Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) is an independent, nonprofit research organization in Ramallah that conducts policy analysis and academic research in the West Bank and Gaza. In December 2001, PCPSR conducted a public-opinion poll of 1,357 Palestinians eighteen years old or older in the West Bank and Gaza. The survey, which was conducted by in-person interviews, covered topics including the participants' views toward the September 11 attacks in the United States, the participants' support for an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, and their opinions about armed attacks against Israel. Under trying circumstances in the middle of one of the worst periods of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a researcher at the center kindly provided us with tabulations of key questions broken down by the educational level and the occupational status of the respondents.

Although public-opinion polls are subject to multiple interpretations, such data can provide indirect information about which segments of the population support terrorist or militant activities. The PCPSR poll reveals several things. First, the support for armed attacks against Israeli targets by the Palestinian population is widespread, though it is important to emphasize that there is a distinction between support for armed attacks expressed in a public-opinion poll at a particular point in time and participation in or active support for such attacks. Second, a majority of the Palestinian population believes that armed attacks against Israeli civilians have helped to achieve Palestinian rights in a way that negotiations could not have achieved. This finding raises obvious implications concerning the difficulty of ending the attacks, and may partially account for the Palestinian public's opposition to a United Nations initiative to fight terrorism, which was also found in the poll. If the Palestinian public believes the attacks are efficacious, they are unlikely to cease supporting additional attacks unless their demands are met. Another question asked was: "To what extent do you support or oppose the position taken by President Arafat and the [Palestinian Authority] regarding the U.S. campaign against terror?" Thirty-six percent supported or strongly supported the position of Arafat in this case, and 50.4 percent opposed it.

Moreover, a majority of the Palestinian population did not consider suicide bombings, such as the one that killed twenty-one Israeli youths at the Dolphinarium disco in Tel Aviv, terrorist events. Toward the end of the questionnaire, respondents were also asked whether they thought the international community considered the Dolphinarium bombing a terrorist event. Ninety-two percent responded yes. These results highlight important differences in interpreting the meaning of the word "terrorism."

MOST IMPORTANT FOR our purposes, there is no evidence in these results that more highly educated individuals are less supportive of violent attacks against Israeli targets than are those who are illiterate or poorly educated. Consider the percentage of individuals who say they support or strongly support armed attacks against Israeli targets less those who say they oppose or strongly oppose such attacks. By a margin of 68 points, those with more than a secondary school education support armed attacks against Israeli targets, while the margin is 63 points for those with an elementary school education and 46 points for those who are illiterate.

A survey conducted by PCPSR in November 1994, before the current intifada, asked respondents whether they supported a dialogue between Hamas and Israel. Responses were reported by educational attainment. More highly educated respondents were less supportive of a dialogue with Israel: 53 percent of those with a B.A. and 40 percent of those with an M.A. or a Ph.D. supported a dialogue, compared with 60 percent of those with nine years of schooling or less. (Based on other questions, it is clear that supporters of dialogue generally favored a more peaceful coexistence with Israel.)

The PCPSR study in 2001 showed also that support for armed attacks against Israeli targets is widespread across all Palestinian occupations and groups, but particularly strong among students (recall that respondents are age eighteen or older) and merchants and professionals. Notably, the unemployed are somewhat less likely to support armed attacks against Israeli targets. If poverty was indeed the wellspring of support for terrorism or politically motivated violence, one would have expected the unemployed to be more supportive of armed attacks than merchants and professionals, but the public-opinion evidence points in the other direction.

The survey also found that the Palestinian population doubted Osama bin Laden's role in the September attacks on New York and Washington. A subsequent

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poll of adults in nine Islamic countries by the Gallup Organization also found considerable skepticism toward the role of bin Laden's group in the attacks. Seventy-four percent of Muslim Lebanese, for example, did not believe news reports that groups of Arabs carried out the attacks, while 65 percent of Christian Lebanese accepted the veracity of the news reports. Respondents in the PCPSR survey were divided on whether they defined as a "terrorist event" the "destruction of the Twin Towers in New York City by people suspected to be members of Bin Laden's organization": 41.4 percent agreed and 53.1 percent disagreed.

IT IS POSSIBLE to use public-opinion data to infer trends in economic expectations. On three occasions—in July–August 1998, in September 1999, and in February 2000—PCPSR asked respondents in the West Bank and Gaza the following two questions: "How would you describe your economic situation over the last three years compared to the situation today? Better, Worse, Stayed the Same, or Don't Know?" and "Are you optimistic or pessimistic regarding your economic situation over the next three years? Optimistic, Pessimistic, It will remain the same, No Opinion/Don't Know?"

The survey results indicate that between 1998 and 2000 the public perceived economic conditions to be improving. Optimism about the future was rising. The downward trend in the unemployment rate is also consistent with this interpretation of economic circumstances. There is little evidence here to suggest that a deteriorating economy or falling expectations for the economy precipitated the latest intifada, which began in September 2000, although it is possible that expectations could have changed between the PCPSR's last survey and the start of the intifada.

In 1995, Joshua Angrist closely examined Palestinian trends in school enrollment, earnings, and unemployment by level of education in a period encompassing the intifada in 1988. He found that college enrollment in the West Bank and Gaza increased rapidly in the early 1980s, doubling between 1981 and 1985. Between 1982 and 1988, the number of Palestinian men in the labor force with twelve or more years of schooling doubled, while the number with eleven or fewer years of schooling increased only by about 30 percent. This remarkable rise in the education of the workforce coincided with a sharp increase in the unemployment rate for college graduates relative to high school graduates in the 1980s. In addition, from 1985 to 1988 the real daily wage of college graduates fell by around 30 percent, while the real wage of those with twelve years of schooling held steady and the real wage of those with eleven or fewer years of schooling increased slightly. Angrist observes that the decline in Palestinian school enrollment in the early 1990s probably represents "a belated supply response to low returns to schooling."

Thus, the noteworthy increase in educational attainment of Palestinians in the 1980s coincided with a marked deterioration in the economic position of more highly educated Palestinians. Angrist and others speculate that the deterioration in economic opportunities for the highly educated contributed to the civil unrest that broke out in December 1987. Angrist notes, though, that the confluence of these developments could be unique to the Palestinian situation, and not a universal response to expanding educational opportunities. Importantly, the Israeli occupation of the territories and the lack of an effective capital market or banking system probably prevented the labor markets in the West Bank and Gaza from functioning smoothly, particularly in light of the fact that many Palestinians are dependent on Israel for jobs. Consequently, the link between an expansion in educational attainment, deteriorating economic conditions, and protest may not generalize. Indeed, the contrasting economic environments surrounding the intifadas in 1988 and 2000 suggest that protest, violence, and even terrorism can follow a rising economic tide or a declining one.

WE ALSO PERFORMED a detailed analysis of participation in Hezbollah in Lebanon, which has reportedly instructed Palestinian extremist groups on the use of suicide bomb attacks. We compared the background characteristics of 129 members of Hezbollah's militant wing who died in action mostly in the late 1980s to those of a random sample of 121,000 young people in the Lebanese population. Many of these militants died fighting Israeli occupation, while others died in suicide bomb attacks or while planting booby traps. The Hezbollah militants in this sample are likely to be representative of those who engaged in terrorist acts, and some were carrying out terrorist acts when they died. Compared to the general Lebanese population from the same age group and region, the Hezbollah militants were actually slightly less likely to come from impoverished households, and were more likely to have attended secondary school or higher. These results suggest that the militants were not particularly drawn from those with the least opportunities in society.

And this conclusion is ratified by political violence on the other side as well. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, numerous

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

Government Failure: A Primer in Public Choice
Gordon Tullock, Arthur Seldon, and Gordon L. Brady
185 pages/cloth $18.95/paper $9.95

When market forces fail us, who will step in to protect the public interest? The government, right? Wrong. This romantic view of bureaucrats coming to the rescue confuses the true relationship between economics and politics. Politicians often cite "market failure" as justification for meddling with the economy, but a group of leading scholars show that this view of an omniscient government correcting an imperfect market is badly mistaken. In *Government Failure,* the authors introduce the basic concepts of this school of study, known as "public choice," which uses the tools of economics to judge government behavior and shows the folly of excessive faith in the state.

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violent attacks against Palestinians were conducted by Israeli Jews in the West Bank and Gaza. These attacks included attempts to kill three Palestinian mayors of West Bank cities and attempts to blow up the Dome of the Rock mosque in Jerusalem. From 1980 to 1984, a total of twenty-three Palestinians were killed in attacks by what became known among Israelis as the Jewish Underground, and 191 Palestinians were injured. The *International Encyclopedia of Terrorism* (1997) refers to these attacks as acts of terrorism. In a ruling in 1985, an Israeli court convicted three Israeli settlers of murder and found others guilty of violent crimes in cases involving attacks in the West Bank.

What were the biographical backgrounds of those involved in these violent attacks by Israeli Jewish extremists? A list may be compiled of the name, the age, the occupation, and the nature of underground activity for twenty-seven individuals involved in the Jewish Underground in the early 1980s, based mainly on a memoir of the Jewish Underground by Haggai Segal, one of its members. It is clear from such a chart that these Israeli extremists were overwhelmingly well-educated and in high-paying occupations. The list includes teachers, writers, university students, geographers, an engineer, a combat pilot, a chemist, and a computer programmer. As Donald Neff observed in 1999 about the three men convicted of murder, "all were highly regarded, well-educated, very religious." Although we have not statistically compared the backgrounds of these extremists to the wider Israeli population, these twenty-seven individuals certainly do not appear to be particularly underprivileged or undereducated.

IV.

THE EVIDENCE THAT we have assembled and reviewed suggests that there is little direct connection between poverty, education, and participation in or support for terrorism. Indeed, the available evidence indicates that compared with the relevant population, participants in Hezbollah's militant wing in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Lebanon were at least as likely to come from economically advantaged families and to have a relatively high level of education as they were to come from impoverished families without educational opportunities. We should caution, however, that the evidence we have considered is tentative due to data limitations. In addition, our focus has been primarily on the Middle East, so our conclusions may not generalize to other regions or circumstances.

Still, less quantitative studies of participants in a variety of forms of terrorism in several different settings have reached a conclusion similar to ours. We are particularly struck by Charles Russell and Bowman Miller's work in this regard. In 1983, to derive a profile of terrorists, they assembled demographic information on more than three hundred fifty individuals engaged in terrorist activities in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East from 1966 to 1976 based on newspaper reports. Their sample consisted of individuals from eighteen revolutionary groups known to engage in urban terrorism, including the Red Army in Japan, the Baader-Meinhof Gang in Germany, the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, the Red Brigades in Italy, and the People's Liberation Army in Turkey. Russell and Miller found that "the vast majority of those individuals involved in terrorist activities as cadres or leaders is quite well educated. In fact, approximately two-thirds of those identified terrorists are persons with some university training, university graduates or postgraduate students." They also report that more than two-thirds of arrested terrorists "came from the middle or upper classes in their respective nations or areas."

Maxwell Taylor likewise concluded from his survey of the literature, in his book *The Terrorist* in 1988, that "neither social background, educational opportunity or attainment seem to be particularly associated with terrorism." And this conclusion also accords with the conclusion of the Library of Congress's report "The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?" This report was prepared for the CIA in September 1999 and foresaw the possibility of Al Qaeda crashing explosive-laden airplanes into the Pentagon, the CIA, or the White House. After reviewing profiles of terrorists, the report observed that "terrorists in general have more than average education," and questioned whether there is a typical terrorist profile.

While economic deprivation may not be associated with participation in terrorism and political violence at the individual level, it may nonetheless matter at the national level. If a country is impoverished, a minority of the relatively well off in that country may turn to terrorism to seek to improve the conditions of their countrymen. One might question, though, whether the goal of many terrorist organizations is to install a political regime that is likely to reduce poverty. In addition, there are well-documented cases of homegrown terrorism in economically advanced countries (remember Timothy McVeigh?), so it is far from clear that poverty at a national level is associated with support for terrorism. Of course, this question can only be addressed by cross-country analyses.

In addition, poverty may indirectly affect terrorism through the apparent connection between economic conditions and the proclivity for countries to undergo civil wars. James Fearon and David Laitin have found that GDP per capita is inversely related to the onset of civil war, and Paul Collier and Anne Hoeffler have found that the growth rate of GDP per capita and the male secondary-school enrollment rate are inversely related to the incidence of civil war. Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Sudan are high-profile examples of countries where civil war provided a hospitable environment for international terrorists to operate. But there are other situations in which countries undergoing a civil war did not provide a breeding ground for international terrorism, so it is unclear how much one should extrapolate from the relationship between economic development and civil war. And terrorism has arisen in many countries that were not undergoing a civil war.

ENOUGH EVIDENCE IS accumulating that it is fruitful to begin to conjecture why participation in terrorism and political violence is apparently unrelated—or positively related—to individuals' income and education. The standard economic model of crime suggests that those with the lowest value of time should engage in criminal activity. But we would hypothesize that in most cases terrorism is less like property crime and more like a violent form of political engagement. More-educated people from privileged backgrounds are more likely to participate in politics, probably in part because political involvement requires some minimum level of interest, expertise, commitment to issues, and effort, all of which are more likely if people are educated enough and prosperous enough to concern themselves with more than economic subsistence. These factors could outweigh the effect of opportunity cost on individuals' decisions to become involved in terrorism.

The demand side for terrorists must be considered as well as the supply side. Terrorist organizations may prefer highly educated individuals over less-educated ones, even for suicide bomb attacks. In addition, educated middle-class or upper-class individuals are better suited to carry out acts of international terrorism than are impoverished illiterates, because the terrorists must fit into a foreign environment to be successful. This consideration suggests that terrorists who threaten economically developed countries will disproportionately be drawn from the ranks of the relatively well off and highly educated.

On the whole, we must conclude that

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there is little reason to be optimistic that a reduction in poverty or increase in educational attainment will lead to a meaningful reduction in the amount of international terrorism without other changes. Jessica Stern has observed that many madrasahs, or religious schools, in Pakistan are funded by wealthy industrialists, and that those schools deliberately educate students to become foot soldiers and elite operatives in various extremist movements around the world. She further reported that "most madrasahs offer only religious instruction, ignoring math, science, and other secular subjects important for functioning in modern society." These observations suggest that, in order to use education as part of a strategy to reduce terrorism, the international community should not limit itself to increasing years of schooling, but should consider very carefully the content of education. ■

A Paler Shade of White

By ERIC ARNESEN

Colored White: Transcending the Racial Past by David R. Roediger

(University of California Press, 323 pp., $29.95)

"WHAT IS A White Man?" asked Charles Chesnutt in the pages of the *Independent*, a mass-circulation weekly, in 1889. This was no mere academic question. "The fiat having gone forth from the wise men of the South that the 'all-pervading, all-conquering Anglo-Saxon race' must continue forever to exercise exclusive control and direction of the government" made it imperative for "every citizen who values his birthright to know who are included in this grandiloquent term." And the African American writer ventured a straightforward answer. It was "perfectly obvious" to him that a white Southerner who invoked the expression "Anglo-Saxon race" surely did "not say what he meant." In Chesnutt's view, it "is not probable that he meant to exclude from full citizenship the Celts and Teutons and Gauls and Slavs who make up so large a proportion of our population; he hardly meant to exclude the Jews." Rather, what was "really meant by this high-sounding phrase was simply the white race," and no further explanation was needed. Anglo-Saxon supremacy implied "that for the good of the country the Negro should have no voice in directing the government."

Judging by the work of certain contemporary historians of race and racial classification in America, things are no longer so straightforward. What was self-evident to Chesnutt, an on-the-scene student of American race relations, is commonly rejected by many of today's students of the history of race. The very solidity of language, of clear-cut and well-understood categories and definitions of who was black and who was white, has given way to the widely accepted notion that race is not a biological category or a trans-historically fixed phenomenon, but is itself socially constructed. Indeed, one is hard-pressed to find credible humanists or social scientists who would claim otherwise. (The few who attempt to resuscitate the old concept of race as biologically or genetically based, like Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray in *The Bell Curve*, find their spurious arguments immediately demolished by a small army of critics.) But some have gone further, posing a variant of Chesnutt's "What is a White Man?" question: if race is socially constructed, then so, too, are the categories into which people are classified and the categories into which they place themselves. "With biologically based racism in retreat," David R. Roediger asserts, "it has become possible to ask bedrock questions such as 'What makes some people think that they are white?' and 'When did white people become white?'"

These are not trivial questions to recent scholars of "whiteness," who have spent the past decade or so producing a stream of books and articles purporting to address them. The last question implies that some white people today were not white at some point in the past, a proposition that whiteness historians have set out to prove. First there was Roediger's seminal *The Wages of Whiteness* (1991), followed by Noel Ignatiev's *How the Irish Became White* (1995), both of which argued that the American public did not see early nineteenth-century Irish immigrants as white, and that the Irish had to fight their way into the more elite category of whiteness. Karen Brodkin then did for Jews what Ignatiev did for the Irish in *How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says About Race in America* (1998). Roediger and James Barrett boldly argued in an essay called "Inbetween Peoples" that the millions of Eastern European and Southern European immigrants who settled in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were not-quite-white, while the labor historian Bruce Nelson and others have applied that notion to the same immigrants and their children as late as the 1940s. Whiteness, some argue, is not just a one-way street, for the process of "becoming" could work both ways: groups recognized as white could be demoted to non-white status. When Texas cotton farmers lost their land and economic independence in the era of the New South, Neil Foley contended in *The White Scourge* (1997), they lost more than their property—they lost their whiteness, too.

These findings, if they are valid, would promise to revolutionize our understanding of the immigrant and working-class experience, and of the history of race in America. Indeed, for some historians on the left, they offer nothing less than a new framework for interpreting the American past, with race—or one version of it—explicitly at its center. And this perspective comes complete with a double dose of moral indictment: the first castigation aimed at those unquestioned whites (Anglo-Saxon types, for instance, whose whiteness was never in question) who racialized new immigrants and denied them the privileges of whiteness; and the second castigation directed at the new immigrants themselves, who climbed their way into whiteness through the adoption of white identities and racist practices that were aimed at increasing the distance between themselves and African Americans (or Asian Americans or Mexican-Americans).

AND YET, ALL their boldness and their buzz notwithstanding, these startling claims have generated more historiographical smoke than fire. More archivally grounded historians of American immigration have remained

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largely and appropriately immune to the trend, though they have yet to articulate a forceful response to the interlopers in their field. Their reluctance to engage with the arguments of the whiteness historians has permitted an unfortunate "jargon creep" in scholarly discussions about race in America, which has passed unchallenged into broader and more traditional scholarship. It is now not uncommon to stumble upon the phrase "how the Irish became white" and the assertion of Irish non-whiteness in writings by scholars of a "progressive" orientation who are not specialists in immigration history.

After a decade of growing popularity, however, whiteness studies—or "critical whiteness studies," as Roediger prefers—remains a vague and intellectually incoherent enterprise. Its core concept of whiteness defies singular definition. On one level, whiteness is about "identity": how those in power identify a subordinate group, and how that subordinate group identifies itself. Elites rarely if ever employed the terminology of whiteness, so whiteness scholars presume to deduce from their statements their true intent. (Since antebellum elites constructed whites as clean, superior, and civilized, presumably those whom they perceived as dirty, inferior, or uncivilized—such as the Irish—were not white.) For members of the subordinate group, by contrast, whiteness might mean claiming the term "white" for themselves, but it also evidently includes articulating anti-black sentiments, participating in anti-black violence, and otherwise subscribing to the tenets of white supremacy. The whiteness scholars do not make rigorous distinctions between the stigmatization of a group, a group's self-characterization, racial thought generally, and discriminatory or other racist behavior. They live in a simple world, chromatically and morally.

On another level, the concept of whiteness denotes power and privileges that are supposed to inhere in an individual's whiteness. Being white gains one access to mortgages, bank loans, and education; it means not being stopped by police for "driving while black." Pointing out not just the effects of discrimination on minorities, but also the affirmative benefits that accrue to many, if not all, members of a majority group, has a certain pedagogical value, to be sure. But whiteness scholars' extreme and essentialist formulations make their categories and contributions analytically quite useless. Roediger recently maintained, for example, that whiteness somehow involves "terror" as integral to the "construction of white identities." What this means is by no means evident. No reputable scholar would for a moment deny the long history of racist violence in the United States, but how "terror" informs the identity of all whites today, or constitutes contemporary whiteness, is a wholly different and unexplained matter.

Being white, then, is a position of power, and an expectation of access to material and psychological resources, and the constitutive element of a group identity that requires an "Other" to disparage. "Whiteness demands that all Whites denigrate, at least passively, those constructed as non-White," concludes the legal scholar Ian F. Haney López in his *White by Law* (1996). "As a category, it depends on a demonization of non-Whites so that by comparison Whites are deified." Whatever else one may think of this line of argument, it is not subtle. Indeed, it may be that the very coarseness of this concept of whiteness, its bluntly totalizing vision, its categorical rejection of ethical and historical ambiguity, is the reason for its widespread appeal. The scholars of whiteness seek not merely to understand the meanings of race in American life, but also to achieve a greater degree of social justice. They are motivated by more than disinterested scholarly inquiry for its own sake; they aim to locate a "useable past" and a "useable present," in Roediger's words. Engaged or impassioned scholarship is not inherently problematic, of course; but light is as important as heat. In the case of the scholarship of whiteness, a politics built on so flimsy a conceptual foundation is sure to consign itself to irrelevance with little help from those whom it seeks to oppose.

THE MOST INFLUENTIAL proponent of the concept of whiteness today is David Roediger. His work has generated interest across disciplinary boundaries and among educated progressives beyond the academy. Roediger inaugurated the examination of whiteness in American labor history in 1991 in *The Wages of Whiteness*, a collection of essays that explored, as its subtitle indicated, "Race and the Making of the American Working Class" in the nineteenth century. His next book, *Towards the Abolition of Whiteness*, which appeared three years later, combined his reflections on the history of race in working-class history with explicit political calls for social transformation. The notion of the "social construction of race" is a "vital intellectual breakthrough," Roediger maintained, but it is "so sweeping that by itself it implies few specific political conclusions." The goal of radical intellectuals, therefore, must be to "suggest where we think that breakthrough may lead politically." For Roediger, that solemn duty translates into the "specific need to attack *whiteness* as a destructive ideology." Not merely a call to the discursive barricades, this means an "assault on white supremacy" in the real world.

Colored White is Roediger's third collection of essays in just over a decade, and it is his most wide-ranging. It is hard to imagine another academic today who has more to say about more subjects, a point confirmed by this latest pastiche of cultural criticism, labor history, and political exhortation. Its historical essays address the antebellum languages of wage slavery, black and white trade unionists' relations in the post–Civil War era, the "nonwhite radicalism" of Roediger's hero John Brown, the supposed "inbetween" racial status of Southern European and Eastern European immigrants in the Progressive era, and the anti-Eurocentrism of the 1929 Surrealist map of the word. In his pieces on contemporary politics, Roediger endorses the movement to free Mumia Abu-Jamal as a far superior model for the labor movement's renaissance than the reform efforts of AFL-CIO president John Sweeney; and he castigates New Democrats and neoliberals for their appeals to the white male working class, their rejection of "race-specific" policies, and their embrace of ostensibly race-neutral strategies. In the essays on culture and politics, Roediger approaches Rush Limbaugh's racism through the prism of the postmodernists' fixation on the colonialist "gaze," and examines the "raceless" appeal of O. J. Simpson in the years before the murder and trial, and lambastes Rudolph Giuliani for his "racist" attack on artist Chris Ofili's *Holy Virgin Mary*, and ponders the political implications of the emergence of "wiggers" (white teens who say they want to be black) by means of a a detour into Elvis Presley's racial "crossings." What is common to all these discussions is Roediger's insistence that all of these things are about race, and that "critical whiteness studies" can make sense of them all.

MUCH OF WHITENESS scholarship, Roediger's included, is thematically rooted in labor history, and, as Roediger acknowledges, it is "much influenced by Marxism." Classical Marxism was never overly concerned with race, as is well known; and Roediger has long argued against what he sees as its subordination of race to class. Yet the historians of working-class whiteness have not broken with Marxism as cleanly as they imply. Although employers and the state virtually vanish in their accounts of labor-market discrimination, whiteness scholars accord the white working class nearly complete "agency" in its own "making" (the complexities of E. P. Thompson's notions notwithstanding). Free to

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make themselves, white workers do so by incorporating whiteness into their self-conception. That is, they define the working class as white and set their own interests apart from those of blacks. To compensate for their lowly class position, they seize the "wages of whiteness," or what Du Bois famously described as a "public and psychological wage."

As much as Roediger suggests otherwise, it is not true that historians have ignored the ways in which white workers often held themselves aloof from, or even positioned themselves in opposition to, African Americans. The literature on the theme is extensive, rich, and varied. What sets the whiteness historians apart from other social historians of working-class race relations is their insistence that, the divisions of race, gender, and skill among workers notwithstanding, workers should have made common cause with one another. They assume that another path—the path of interracial working-class unity—was available to white workers, and they chose not to take it. The whiteness historians require some explanation to account for the failure of workers (particularly white workers) to fulfill their assigned historical mission. And so they lower the "public and psychological wage" onto the historical set as a *deus ex machina*, providing the long-awaited explanation for the failure of unity in this model-driven historical tragedy.

THE FORAYS OF whiteness historians into the realm of cultural analysis are less encumbered by pseudo-Marxist presumptions, and they reveal a different set of methodological and conceptual issues. The Lincoln-Douglas debate in Freeport, Illinois in 1858 furnishes Roediger with an opportunity to demonstrate his approach. Present at that debate was a boisterous crowd chanting "white men, white men" and "white, white," and Roediger feels that the crowd's choice of words must be explained. In the original version of his essay, which was first published in the *Journal of the Early Republic*, Roediger has the Douglas backers chanting "white men, white men" "over and over": this, he concludes, gave "voice to the popularity of white identity in the late antebellum United States." Whiteness "among midwesterners, and among rural populations generally," is "so understudied," he asserts; but the "recent and much celebrated historiography on whiteness . . . effectively positions us to understand that shouting crowd."

So how does it do that? According to Roediger, the Democratic Party's base of support "depended on the incorporation of the Irish and other immigrants as white voters." Drawing enthusiastically on Ignatiev's *How the Irish Became White*, Roediger reminds us, well, how the Irish became white. This racial transformation, Roediger reasons, compelled the Democratic candidate Stephen Douglas to go beyond an "Anglo-Saxon whiteness to posit a pan-white 'American race' that could resonate dramatically." Roediger adds that recent analyses of minstrels have thrown light on the "homosocial habit of affirming white maleness in public," and this "goes to the heart of how Douglas's auditors rehearsed their chants and knew their lines." And finally, Roediger maintains, cross-class alliances—including those of the Democratic Party—were facilitated by white identity, which provided "real and psychological payoffs to the poorest Douglas Democrats"—a subject that is "central to the agenda of studies showing what it mean to be 'not a slave' in an increasingly class-divided and proletarianized labor force."

What is wrong with this picture? A lot, I think. For a start, there is the rather insurmountable problem that David Brion Davis pointed out in a rejoinder to Roediger's original essay: the Freeport crowd did not do precisely what Roediger says it did. "White men, white men" was heard but once over the course of the long speeches delivered that day, along with "white, white" and various anti-black retorts, and—this is especially significant—heckling by Lincoln's supporters that mocked Douglas's anti-black remarks. In the revised version of his essay in this book, Roediger modifies his narrative slightly to remove references to the chanting of "white men, white men." The fact remains that the Freeport debate, as recorded by contemporaries, appears rather different than Roediger would have us imagine it.

Then there is the issue of just what it is that we do not understand about those "chanting" or "shouting" white men that critical whiteness studies enables us to understand. The racial views of mid-nineteenth century Americans—Midwesterners included—have received more than their fair share of attention from several generations of historians. Roediger is not as revolutionary or as innovative as he thinks he is. Some of his questions about the motivations of the white crowd in Freeport, and even about its use of language, have been satisfactorily addressed by numerous scholars over the past decades. Eric Foner's classic *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*, for example, systematically and eloquently explored antebellum white Northerners' views of themselves, their society, slaves and slavery, and the white South, and Foner's book was published in 1970, well before the advent of

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
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whiteness studies and its irritating jargon.

And then there is the sweeping character of the alleged insights of critical whiteness studies. These generalizations require a willful suspension of disbelief to retain their plausibility. At a minimum, sustaining them would require knowing something—knowing anything—about the two thousand men who attended the debate in Freeport, a community in northwest Illinois near the Wisconsin border that was, in fact, a center of Republican Party strength. Were they farmers, or members of a proletarianized labor force, or shopkeepers? Were they native-born Americans, or Irish or German immigrants? Had the men in the crowd regularly, or even occasionally, attended minstrel shows? For Roediger, these are irrelevant incidentals to the great whiteness story, which is less about actual human beings in concrete historical circumstances than it is about the selling of an idea. In Roediger's version of American history, if something happened somewhere (or could be imagined to have happened somewhere), it could happen anywhere. Did white workers attend minstrel shows in New York? Then they must have attended them in Freeport. Unencumbered by the evidentiary rules of history, Roediger replaces the old-fashioned toil of historical reconstruction with the glib and equally unsubstantiated insights of tendentious academics purportedly demonstrating a causal connection.

Mr. Emerson Tries to Complete an Essay

At his hard desk, no longer wholly conscious
Of the pen in his right hand, no longer confined
By the dimensions of the floor and the four walls
But ascending through the ceiling toward the threshold
Of Transcendental Understanding, he heard
Ker-luck-a-put, cluck, the chickens, his own
Chickens outside the window, one of which
Would be reduced to portions of itself
And stewed for dinner, and though he had lost
The thrust of his hierarchic argument
For a moment, he took the chicken to be an example
Of the universally disguised emblems
Of Earthly Duty, and when the door flew open
To reveal the offerings, on one hand and the other,
Of carpet samples, one dearer, one less lasting,
He took it as his share in the design
Of the Awesome Now on which the gods themselves
Would weave the threads of an instrumental order
From the Raw Mundane to the Ineffable,
Both necessarily now being postponed
For his best black mourning suit and a mourning band
Firmly clasped on his biceps and his hat
Just as firmly set so the narrow brim
Was central to the brow and the occiput
And crossed both temples equally on the way
To the carriage, up the step to his plush cushion
And the funeral of a newly translated cousin.

David Wagoner

Roediger's book moves forward and backward in time in an apparent effort to demonstrate the relevance of critical whiteness studies to both history and contemporary society. In "Smear Campaign," one of the volume's previously unpublished and more far-fetched essays, Roediger turns his attention to Rudolph Giuliani's notorious attack on Chris Ofili's notorious painting *Holy Virgin Mary*, which was displayed in 1999 at the Brooklyn Museum of Art's self-fulfillingly named show "Sensation." Roediger acknowledges the overt political explanations for Giuliani's crusade: engaged in a bitter fight with Hillary Clinton for a Senate seat, the mayor of New York City seized an opportunity to court upstate conservative and Catholic voters, as well as the support of the state's Conservative Party and Catholic hierarchy (who were unimpressed with Giuliani's pro-choice and gay rights stances). But this straightforward analysis takes us "only so far in understanding either the form or the content of Giuliani's campaign against Ofili's work," Roediger insists. Once again the critical study of whiteness comes to the rescue. No matter what the subject, whiteness lurks at its heart.

Neither Giuliani nor the media amplified what for Roediger is the central point: that the Madonna in Ofili's painting is a black Madonna. Nor did they properly acknowledge that Ofili himself was Catholic; this was not, as Giuliani claimed, a matter of an attack on "somebody else's religion." For Roediger, Ofili's black Madonna, "and Giuliani's reaction to it, may profitably be placed in a long tradition of artistic challenges to the idea of an 'extreme white' Holy Family." Giuliani's response can better be explained, according to Roediger, by restoring his Italian-American background to the narrative. The mayor grew up in an all-white Long Island community; his grandparents came to a "nation in which immigrants from Italy were lynched, excluded, called 'guineas,'" and they were themselves not-quite-white upon arrival in the United States. Moreover, in ways that "could not have been lost on Giuliani," black Madonnas were common in Sicily, despite official church efforts to marginalize them. In the United States, Roediger suggests, putting the black Madonna behind them may have been part of an "'assimilation' into U.S.-style whiteness" by Italian-Americans.

Did Giuliani know about any of this? Evidence is irrelevant here, as it is wherever hidden causalities are preferred. "Whether Giuliani was denied an experience with black Madonnas in New York's Catholic churches and schools or heard dark rumors of their existence," Roediger concludes, "he clearly would have known about New York City's most celebrated Italian-American shrine, the Madonna of 115th Street in East Harlem," and its annual *festa*. But what is the relevance of the Madonna of 115th Street to the mayor and the painting? According to Roediger, Italian-Americans felt their whiteness threatened by Puerto Ricans moving into the neighborhood; and a nearby church had a statue of a black Italian saint, suggesting the "possibility of a road not taken, toward an egalitarian pan-Latin challenge to the hyper-whiteness of holiness." But alas, Italian-Americans "more typically took a road to white identity." For Roediger, Giuliani's "ethnicity and location prepared him well to see the need to draw tight the racial boundaries surrounding Mary." Guilt not just by association, but by social and geographic location!

And then there was the "state-sponsored effort to stigmatize Ofili's work as 'shit'" brought in by "outsiders." Roediger goes to some lengths to denounce Giuliani's misrepresentation of Ofili's use of elephant dung, but he fails to recognize the irony or the artist's crass self-promotion for what it was. How else to interpret the fact, reported by Roediger, that Ofili himself took out large ads "in trendy arts publications simply stating

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'Elephant Shit'"? Roediger understands the mayor's obsession with "shit" as being symbolically linked to his "larger and long-standing campaigns to 'clean up' the city by removing its homeless and its sex workers from sight." What does this have to do with race, or with whiteness? Everything, as usual. Roediger's penchant for pseudo-psychoanalysis leads him to conclude that the mayor's "'pro-civilization' offensives against Ofili and other putative impurities in the city evoke rich connections among excrement, smearing, savagery, blackness, and white self-images regarding control, anality, and capital accumulation." Indeed, he suggests that "they could themselves be the subject of a psychoanalytically informed essay." Mercifully, we are spared that essay.

Finally, we are told, whiteness is also evident in the "content of Giuliani's vote-catching appeals." In attacking a black Madonna without resorting to overt racist language, Giuliani was fishing not just for Catholic and conservative votes, but for white votes as well. When it was all over, in Roediger's view, whiteness chalked up the larger victory when "any serious discussion of religion, gender, race, and power" was dismissed from the agenda. No African artists or critics were consulted by the mainstream media, and the "racism of Giuliani's efforts to restrict free expression has gone largely unremarked." The score is clear: Giuliani zero, whiteness one. Or, rather, whiteness won.

By turns self-congratulatory and defensive, Roediger is on the lookout for those threatening the true path of racial justice. And lurking out there in the sinister realm of print journalism are individuals who advance theses that promise to denigrate the efforts of today's anti-racist activists or lull us into optimism about the demographic changes that are ostensibly easing us toward a hybrid future in which race, as we know it today, becomes less recognizable and potentially less salient. Roediger does not want race, or race consciousness, to disappear. He has bet everything on it.

The guilty parties are easy to identify. Roediger begins his polemic by taking aim at "The New Face of America," an issue of *Time* magazine that appeared in 1993 and featured the efforts of the magazine's computer technicians, who, using Morph 2.0 software, projected the face of "Eve," a multi-racial woman and conceivably the nation's "new face" at some point in the twenty-first century. That attractive face functions "to mock allegedly outmoded emphases on the ugliness and exploitation of race relations in the United States." Orlando Patterson's brief speculative foray into a possible multi-racial future in the pages of The New Republic in 2000 comes in for a similar drubbing. Patterson's sin was to predict that the race problem will disappear over the next century as new hybrid groups appear and as class distinctions sharpen. The "'race is over' school," Roediger argues, "tends to cut off the present and the future from any serious relationship to the past." Race is not "over," he declares, and it will not be over for a long time. (Never mind that the inter-racial or post-racial future provocatively pictured by Patterson was by no means a utopia, but a place full of conflict and violence.)

For Roediger, the problem with any hypothetical musings about the racial configuration of the future or the growing hybridity of the population is that they seem to imply a painless passage to a happy, multicultural America that he believes cannot come to pass, or at least without ceaseless struggle. He knows that the world has changed; he admits that scientific racism, segregation, disfranchisement, and other barbarisms are gone. But he insists that white supremacy remains nonetheless. (Roediger cites approvingly George Lipsitz's remark that the anti-immigration and anti-affirmative action laws of the 1990s rendered California the "Mississippi of the 1990s.") The more race things change, the more race things stay the same. Roediger's ultimate problem with "Eve" and the "race is over" proponents is that in the face of persistent racial inequality they "mock antiracist initiatives as anachronistic and wrong." They "ask us to practice (or abandon) the politics of racial justice in the shadow of someone who does not exist." They suggest that "antiracism is therefore irrational, counterproductive, or even itself racist." Roediger's imagination gets the best of him here, as he implicitly equates any criticism of his own strident political stance—or any debate about other paths to equality—with a denial of the persistence of racism or an endorsement of the racial status quo. It is simply false that those who speculate that "Eve" will emerge naturally from inter-racial and inter-ethnic marriages are sending the message that "attempts to build coalitions that address racism and sexism together" should be abandoned.

To acknowledge that our national discourses on race are complex, contradictory, and evolving would be to undermine the morality tale contained in Roediger's book. The media hardly brings only good news about race in America. There are innumerable stories (not to mention the steady spate of scholarly studies) on the persistence of discrimination in housing and employment, on racial profiling and police brutality toward minorities, and on enduring poverty among urban African Americans. Racism is hardly becoming a taboo subject, as Roediger believes. To cite but one conspicuous example: race "is still very much lived in America," Joseph Lelyveld concludes in the introduction to *How Race Is Lived in America*, a compilation of *The New York Times*'s much-admired series of articles in 2000. The "story of our struggle to become one nation is far from over ... the challenge has not receded." This does not exactly suggest that race is over. I do not doubt that Roediger would have complaints with the *Times* articles; but a serious analysis of the honest, if often flawed, efforts at grappling with the meanings of race—and, yes, power—in American society would require more than the shallow slogans served up in *Colored White*.

If Roediger's book consists largely of old arguments applied to new examples, in one respect it introduces a conceptual innovation in his approach. In addition to whiteness, he maintains, we need now to "theorize and historicize the concept of nonwhiteness in thinking about race in the United States." And just what is "nonwhiteness"? First there is the anticipatory disclaimer that "*nonwhiteness* is an offensive term"—to whom?—in that it "exemplifies the tendency to place whites at the normative center of everything and to marginalize everyone else." But the utility of the term "nonwhiteness" is owed to the fact that it allows us to think about "how the *nation* can become something other than white." This means "creating space for nonwhiteness" and "expanding the opportunity to live in nonwhite spaces" in a way that "encourages us to support initiatives attacking institutional racism." Such a "theoretical" concept, in Roediger's mind, has the "potential to remind us that coalitions between whites and people of color need not always and everywhere be the key to social transformation. Coalitions among people of color also represent a critical route to nonwhite politics."

Come on. Does any genuine student of American politics and society really think that inter-racial coalitions are "always and everywhere" the key to social transformation? These arguments in support of "nonwhiteness" are even more garbled than Roediger's arguments for "whiteness." The essays in his book's second section, titled "Toward Nonwhite Histories," invoke the past to "show that the sway of whiteness is not inevitable, unalterable, or simple. It was never the whole story of U.S. history." The first essay lionizes John Brown for his uncompromising commitment to "struggling alongside Black freedom fighters." (Brown's resort to what we now might call terrorism at Pottawatomie Creek in Kansas finds no mention in Roediger's

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hagiography.) A second essay examines the use of the term "slavery" by white workers and women's rights activists in the antebellum era, and a third essay, called "The Pursuit of Whiteness," concerns itself with "property, terror, and national expansion," in the words of its subtitle. The final piece, "Inbetween Peoples," attempts to establish—unsuccessfully—the non-white status of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe. What any of this has to do with non-white spaces is anyone's guess. Contemporary historians certainly do not need Roediger to instruct them that abolitionism was "in some senses not white" and that the movement drew membership and inspiration from African Americans.

If, after a decade of "theorizing," the concept of whiteness remains a muddled catch-all, something that seeks academic and political legitimation as a cover for its intellectual incoherence, its proponents' goals, too, remain unclear. In response to the left's perennial question—"What is to be done?"—Roediger might answer: bring about a withering away of whiteness, or alternatively, an abolition of whiteness. Ian F. Haney López has argued that whiteness, since it "perpetuates injurious racial identities," "should be abandoned." Whites should "renounce their racial identity as it is currently constituted in the interests of social justice."

That scholar-activists of whiteness and its abolition can seriously advocate these outlandish propositions is surely a reflection of their disillusionment with the often naïve class politics that they once advocated, and a rejection of the romanticized white working class that they once championed. It also reflects, to some degree, a methodological preference among some segments of the academic left for the cultural studies-ish interpretation of texts over "old-fashioned" archival research. Over the past decade, "whiteness" has emerged as an all-purpose, pre-fabricated category that has been retailed aggressively, and successfully, in the academic marketplace. But given how little substance there is in the histories of whiteness, and how irrelevant are the scholarly programs of the category's practitioners, the defenders of white power and white privilege will continue to sleep easy. ■

God's Pragmatist

By ERIN LEIB

Varieties of Religion Today: William James Revisited by Charles Taylor

(Harvard University Press, 127 pp., $19.95)

THE RECENT BLIZZARD of pragmatism has produced many discussions about William James, but there is one side of James that has been almost programmatically neglected. It is a side of James that James himself cherished, and it provides the great reason for so much of what he wrote, for so much of his philosophical pluralism, and for his campaign against idealism. I am referring to James the obsessively religious man, who was committed to devising a philosophy that would provide a foundation for spiritual experience, and to opening up room for faith in an increasingly secular world. Now at last we have a book about this James, and it has been produced by a religiously obsessed man himself.

Charles Taylor has been writing philosophy for many years, and the scope of his achievement is extraordinary. He has written on ethics, epistemology, language, and politics. He has analyzed Greek, medieval, Renaissance, and modern thought in learned discourses on the history of ideas. Even more amazing, perhaps, is that a corpus of philosophy so wide should be so intellectually coherent. All of Taylor's writings are unified by a goal, a mission, almost a calling: to understand by philosophical means who we have become and who we ought to strive to become.

Though he never argues for theism in his major works, Taylor does articulate a genealogy of morals that places Christianity squarely at its core. Freedom, reason, equality, and universal benevolence all have their roots in biblical values, according to *Sources of the Self*, Taylor's magnum opus, even if moderns do not wish to recognize their debt, and even if they consciously reject it. Taylor's account of the origin of the ideal of disengaged reason, for example, goes roughly like this: in the Christian narrative, God endowed humans with rationality to exert control over nature and over themselves. In exercising this capacity, they could distinguish themselves from other creatures—hence the relationship between reason and human dignity. With time, disengaged reason was itself ennobled more and more as it became dissociated from divinely endowed dignity.

Whatever the historical accuracy of this account, its religious tendency is plain. Taylor tightly binds our contemporary moral condition to our religious past. Over the years, he has been accused of injecting Christian theology into philosophy, of promoting his own religious beliefs as the foundation of his moral theory. He has denied this, saying that "the nature of philosophical discourse ... has to try to persuade honest thinkers of any and all metaphysical or theological commitments." He fastidiously honors the difference between philosophy and religion, and he believes that the propositions of religion must be philosophically scrutinized. He insists that his account of the evolution of selfhood in the West is descriptive and nothing more. But recently Taylor has begun to explore in earnest the dynamics of contemporary theism and secularism. In 1999 he published *A Catholic Modernity?*, a look at the connections and the tensions between transcendence and human flourishing in our time. And now he has published *Varieties of Religion Today*.

SO LET US revisit William James for a moment. In 1901–1902, James delivered the Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh, a series established to "promote and diffuse the study of Natural Theology in the widest sense of the term—in other words, the knowledge of God." His twenty lectures were soon published as *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, and became one of the most widely read and most highly influential treatises on religion by an American. The work inaugurated a Copernican turn in religious studies away from the objective terms of religion—God, the cosmos—toward the subjective human experience of religion.

James offered a picture of religion that revolves dramatically around individual experience. It is the inner lives of men and women, their spontaneous glimpses of a world beyond, he claimed, that determine their attachments to divinity. The locus of religion is inside the individual, not outside: "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may

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consider divine." The sphere of subjective and even solipsistic intuition is wide: every individual is capable of discovering God internally and defining God differently. The direct encounter is unique, for James, and it is importantly unmediated by social or ritual or linguistic institutions.

Belief in the primacy of experience brought James to a damning view of orthodoxies, and of the institutions of religion generally. He accused them of taking ecstatic moments and squashing them through routinization, of making them banal. In *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, James asserted that

> when a religion has become an orthodoxy its days of inwardness are over; the spring is dry; the faithful live at second hand exclusively and stone the prophets in their turn. The new church ... can be henceforth counted as a staunch ally in every attempt to stifle the spontaneous religious spirit, and to stop all the later bubblings of the fountain from which in purer days it drew its own supply of inspiration.

James's criticism emerged not from an assessment of the particular practices of churches, but from his definition of religion as an exclusively private phenomenon. Public institutions are simply powerless in this respect. They might be able to transmit "at second hand" reports of the inspiring experiences of ancient people, but they can neither capture nor engender those experiences themselves. On the contrary, they repress those moments of intensity through authoritative regulation and "dull habit." They dilute the depths of religion by intruding upon the free domain of the spirit. The religious person of *The Varieties of Religious Experience* is therefore charged to stand alone, so as to experience divinity deeply. Neither ritual (collective practice) nor theology (collective thinking) will ever spur the spirit to action, says James. Inspiration resides only and essentially in the individual. He defended a radical empiricism against the baroque systems of the idealists, so as to make sense experience available for the purposes of the soul. For this reason, he is not remotely the ally of John Dewey that today's pragmatists make him out to be. In a profound way, James was not a secular man.

In 1897, in his essay "The Will to Believe," James assigned another important religious role to the individual, one that itself precedes religious experience. In an effort to secure the foundation of religious belief in a world without revelation, in a world in which doubt is philosophically plausible, James argued at length—in fine Augustinian form—that faith, like love, cannot be found unless one opens oneself to it. The commitment to searching, and to the possibility of finding, is intellectual security enough for the attempt to arrive at the spiritual destination. James's argument is not to affirm the religious choice, but rather to affirm the right to make the religious choice in the absence of incontrovertible evidence.

> The thesis I defend is, briefly stated, this: Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, "Do not decide, but leave the question open," is itself a passional decision—just like deciding yes or no—and is attended to the same risk of losing the truth.

James famously rejected the "agnostic's veto" on the grounds that one always has to make choices. Questions always beckon and the loss of truth is always risked. The only issue is whether one chooses to risk a loss of truth for fear of error. Hope is not as flimsy as some people think. "What proof is there that dupery through hope is so much worse than dupery through fear? I, for one, can see no proof; and I simply refuse obedience to the scientist's command to imitate this kind of option, in a case where my own stake is important enough to give me the right to choose my own form of risk." James was a remarkable kind of rationalist: he taught that it was a rational choice to go beyond rationality. He does not explicitly argue for faith, but gives grounding to those who decide to side with it. And this decision cannot be a social or institutional decision. Only individual men and women can make James's spiritualist-pragmatist wager.

In 1999, almost a century after William James took the podium at Edinburgh, Charles Taylor did the same. Following in the footsteps of other notable Gifford lecturers such as James Frazer, Alfred N. Whitehead, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Iris Murdoch, Taylor wrestled with the task of advancing the study of theology philosophically. And he found himself studying James in preparation. When the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna then invited him to lecture in the spring of 2000, he seized the opportunity to further his conversation with James. That intellectual engagement has become this small but very stimulating book.

Taylor's book is a helpful if uneven review of the primacy of the individual in James's work, an inquiry into the philosophical origins of this view, and a criticism of it in the name of communitarianism. He begins his analysis by praising the contemporaneity of James's work, which so presciently anticipated the focus on individuality and inwardness that has characterized modernity. Taylor takes James to be a veritable spokesman for the modern world and the modern self.

In addition to highlighting James's call for individual experience, Taylor calls our attention to James's categorizations of religious individuals. In particular he stresses James's category of "sick souls," those who are painfully in touch with the suffering of the world. These morbid souls, a profound bunch in James's estimation, observe and endure a deep sense of helplessness and hopelessness in the face of the continual loss and the perpetual evil in the world. For them, the world is truly an abyss. Taylor discerns three dimensions of this abyss: the alien world becomes meaningless, its evil becomes overwhelmingly frightening, and its people become sinners. James finds these souls interesting insofar as they are susceptible to experiences of deliverance. Should they make their way to the other side of the abyss and embrace the world through God, they become "twice born" and attuned to the complexities of religious faith.

Taylor, by contrast, finds these "sick souls" interesting because their melancholy nicely exemplifies "the malaise of modernity." He believes that modern melancholy is of a wholly different sort from the sadness that preceded it. People who lost their feeling of meaningfulness in the past did so in a world that was self-evidently meaningful. God was God and good and evil were pretty clearly defined, only there were times when individuals felt alienated from these realities. Modern melancholy, by contrast, enjoys no such assurance of a meaning beyond the self. "It therefore has a new shape," writes Taylor, "not the sense of rejection and exile from an unchallengeable cosmos of significance, but rather the intimation of what may be a definitive emptiness, the final dawning of the end of the last illusion of significance. It hurts, one might say, in a new way." Focusing in broad strokes on the Jamesian abyss, Taylor credits James with identifying what he takes to be the primary spiritual challenge of the present generation, the threat of absolute meaninglessness.

Taylor also sees modernity as fundamentally characterized by religious doubt. While he does not deny that there are many strong believers (himself among them, presumably), he observes that it is extremely rare for someone in this era to maintain his or her beliefs without challenge. The intellectual comfort of the past,

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the old regime of clarity and certainty about ultimate verities, is much more scarce than it was when national or at least communal religion could be taken for granted. James is also prescient here for Taylor. In his assessment of the risk of belief, most explicitly in "The Will to Believe," James articulated the condition of being on the brink, pulled in two directions, but forced to make a choice, no matter how tenuous, over and over again. He describes the difficulty and the drama of spiritual decision-making, and for this Taylor admiringly calls him "our great philosopher of the cusp."

THE MAIN CONCERN of Taylor's new book is the Jamesian insistence upon the supreme importance of individual experience for religion. Taylor recognizes the descriptive power of this notion for moderns, but he contests James's prescriptive claim for this preference. Taylor is not a big fan of alienation. He does not see—or bless—individuation as the condition of faith. Quite the contrary. He believes that the reality of individualism is the beginning of the discussion about religion, not the end of it; that individualism needs, for the sake of religion, to be corrected and amplified.

Taylor has written much about the phenomenon of modern individualism, which he has dubbed (following Adorno and Trilling and others) a culture of authenticity. In *Sources of the Self* (1989) and its smaller sister, *The Ethics of Authenticity* (1991), he examined the development of the modern turn inward and investigated what we have gained and what we have lost as a result. By "authenticity," Taylor refers to the contemporary drive to be true to oneself, to achieve self-fulfillment through self-expression. Authenticity involves deep-rooted senses of inwardness, of freedom, and therefore of empowered agency. It promotes self-creation as well as self-discovery, an emphasis on originality, and an opposition to externally imposed norms.

This authenticity is a welcome development for Taylor. It has opened up human potential and brought people a greater sense of fullness, as they appropriate their lives as their own. It has made them more aware of, and more responsible for, the ramifications of their choices. But there are dangers and disadvantages to this celebrated individualism, says Taylor, among them the loss of "larger social and cosmic horizons of meaning." This loss manifests in two distinct ways. First, in the rise of relativism: centering on the self has bred self-generated values that have no room for the standards generated by society. The freedom to choose is itself often prized above making right choices. Second, authenticity has bred a narcissistic dismissal of the need for others. Concerns beyond the self do not compel in the way they once did. Neither God nor good, neither church nor community, beckons urgently. The cultivation of relationships is frequently deemed secondary, or not at all relevant, to the cultivation of the self.

Taylor argues in his larger works that the undermining of these broader "horizons of meaning" is actually an undermining of authenticity itself. Relativism, when it entails choice for choice's sake, betrays its own search for significance, as it makes all options equally frivolous and therefore no option valuable. The authentic requirement of self-choosing as a moral ideal—that is, one that makes a claim of significance—loses all of its weight as a result. In *The Ethics of Authenticity*, he writes:

> I can define my identity only against the background of things that matter. But to bracket out history, nature, society, the demands of solidarity, everything but what I find in myself, would be to eliminate all candidates for what matters.... Authenticity is not the enemy of demands that emanate from beyond the self; it supposes such demands.

Individualism is thus the friend of collective standards. There are "inescapable horizons" in response to which we make choices in the world.

With regard to human relationships, Taylor relies on his conception of the self as "dialogical"—that is, as fundamentally born of exchanges with others. He asserts that identity is always built out of dialogue with, or struggles against, the perceptions of significant others. The dialogues need not be verbalized continuously, but they reside in a person's psyche indefinitely. For the recognition and the challenge of the other are the "crucibles of inwardly generated identity." The "self only exists within ... 'webs of interlocution,'" Taylor declares in *Sources of the Self*. There is no self but the self embedded in a context.

Taylor's argument about the limits of narcissism follows: if self-generated identity is the core of authenticity, and such identity requires the spur of another, then authenticity rationally demands relations with beings other than the self. Indeed, the implication of both of the above arguments is that a community of others—other ideas and other people—has an essential place even in the life of the highly individualistic member of contemporary culture. It is the great irony of individualism, Taylor wisely suggests, that it cannot be achieved alone.

And so Taylor now takes issue with James's religious encouragement of absolute individualism. After paying lengthy homage to the descriptive power of James in foreshadowing the post-Durkheimian world in which we now live, Taylor presents a criticism of James that operates on two somewhat confused levels. At some points, he argues that individual experience is limited. At others, he argues that such experience might actually be impossible. The latter argument about the strict impossibility of individual experience, which is entertained more than rigorously articulated, draws on the notion of the dialogical self as well as the social nature of language. Taylor posits that since language is shared, and thus inherently communal, any experience will of necessity be filtered and internalized through a communal lens. What we would call "religious experience," then, can never be entirely unmediated. It will always be informed by prior conceptions of what that experience can be, and so there simply cannot be a wholly individual experience.

This is weak and Taylor knows it. It is true that language is shared, but surely this does not force us to conclude that no sentence can possibly be original. What matters is how we uniquely inflect common possessions, not only how we may create raw materials. Individualism does not require each of us to invent our own language; it requires only that each of us use the language that we inherit in new ways, to say new things. Is a painting not original because it makes use of the shared color red? Surely originality is not an invention of origins.

THANKFULLY, TAYLOR LEANS primarily on an argument for the limits of individual religious experience rather than for its impossibility. He makes a critical distinction between an individualist motive and an individualist path. Our era might in fact be characterized by a drive for authentic, individual experiences of the divine, but the anti-institutional, anti-collectivist attitude that James harbors need not follow from this. True individualism, Taylor believes, should allow an individual the choice to relinquish isolation, to transfer his or her experiences onto a community of believers, because presence in a group does not necessarily dull the already internalized religious sensibility.

In a similar vein, Taylor argues that spiritual intuitions often have ritualized translations. Momentary illuminations may yield disciplined behaviors, often communally based or communally prescribed ones. One may meditate alone, but draw from the patterns of ancient spiritual traditions. Or one might attend a communal prayer service to perpetuate the "momentary sense of wow!" once ex-

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perienced deeply. In contrast to James, Taylor detects a necessary partnership between solitude and solidarity in the religious life. Whether on theological or sociological grounds, there is room for individuality to profit from community. For Taylor, James's failure to see this possibility caused him mistakenly to shrink the sphere of religion.

Taylor's criticism of James, then, is ultimately an apology for a communitarian theology, for a religious philosophy that places community at its core. His own lifelong communitarian project—of defending an authenticity in the context of collectivity—is here only further buttressed by his attempt to revalidate public ritual for private religion. So Taylor the religionist is not all that different from Taylor the philosopher. The search for sources of the self continues, though in slightly varied terms.

But there are problems. Taylor has too much confidence in the community. To counter James's portrait of individual subjectivity, Taylor proposes a kind of collective subjectivity, where individuals come together to affirm and direct one another's unique experiences. But is collective subjectivity really a correction of subjectivity? Is it not itself vulnerable to collective narcissism? Groups, like individuals, can become atomized, self-referential, self-congratulatory entities with no horizons of significance beyond themselves. We know too well that the authenticity of groups can be even more disastrous than the authenticity of individuals. Taylor's confidence that group interaction would counteract self-indulgence and enrich self-understanding seems unwarranted.

The only way to correct the excesses of subjectivity is with an appeal to objectivity; but objectivity is usually the opposite of solidarity and the sensation of belonging. Taylor is oddly unconcerned about the actual content of religious belief, about its truth. But surely the question that the individual—the lonely man of faith, in the words of a modern Jewish thinker—must ask is not "What do my fellows believe?" but "Is what I believe true?" In this way the self will certainly be restrained and humbled, as it submits to a standard that is not only outside of the self, but outside of selves altogether.

Taylor's reluctance to entertain the possibility of objectivity and its use for religion seems to be rooted more in sociological descriptions of the culture of authenticity than in reasoned philosophy. It is an odd criticism to make about Taylor, but in this book there is not enough philosophy. Taylor is assuming a world in which claims of objectivity have no sympathy, when he should be arguing for why that should or should not be the case. Either religious experience is an experience of something, or it is not; and no amount of affection for religion can unburden us of the task of finding out. ■

CORRESPONDENCE

continued from page 4

substantial experience in the Middle East. Such an agency could provide not only a broad array of staff with varied experience in p.r. and public affairs, but also some central management—a commodity that seems to be totally lacking in the Bush administration.

LEE LEVITT
New York, New York

Speech class

TO THE EDITORS:

Although I have been concerned about the advent of so-called "free speech zones" on college campuses since my days in college, I feel that I must clear up one misconception in Diane Roberts's article ("Zoned Out," May 13). Roberts specifically mentions Kansas State as example of a school with such a zone and later comments that free speech zones are "often located in obscure corners of the campus—safely out of sight of deans, donors, and the general public." Although the free speech zone at Kansas State is disappointingly small, I can speak from experience as a 1993 graduate that the free speech zone there is in a very prominent place, just outside the main entrance to the student union. On more than one occasion, there were vibrant and colorful debates that occurred there, well within the view of administration officials and involving many students who happened upon the event during the normal course of the day. I like to think my alma mater has made an effort to accommodate the obvious need for free speech on campus with a reasonable need to ensure safety and some level of order. And I personally never saw campus police round up anyone and haul them off to jail because they were protesting somewhere on campus.

DAVID VOGEL
Wichita, Kansas

TO THE EDITORS:

It's not just free speech that's eroding at universities; it's also freedom of the press. For example, Washington University in St. Louis recently revised its "Media Guidelines," which require reporters to get advance permission before entering the campus and which assert the right of a Public Affairs Office representative to be present at interviews between a reporter and a student or faculty member—a little bit of the Soviet Union, right here in the United States. To wit: Last fall a reporter covering a demonstration was expelled from campus.

JONATHAN KATZ
Professor of Physics
Washington University
St. Louis, Missouri

Acid test

TO THE EDITORS:

Michelle Cottle asserts that the "government must level the playing field" in the public's anti-fat campaign but argues that the inherent complexities make reform unworkable ("Heavy Duty," May 13). She fails to recognize, however, a clear target for life-saving reform: trans-fatty acids. Evidence clearly links these industrial fats with increased rates of cardiovascular disease, our nation's leading killer. A 1999 *New England Journal of Medicine* study implicated trans-fatty acids with a "substantial number of deaths from coronary artery disease." Trans-fatty acids are used widely in fast foods, margarine, and commercially baked goods as a result of their low cost and convenient properties. The force of law is the only counter to this industrial allure. Currently no food-labeling requirements exist on trans-fatty-acid content, a simple first step in battling this underemphasized killer.

JEFFREY M. BURNS, M.D.
Charlottesville, Virginia

Unbridled passion

TO THE EDITORS:

I want to compliment Jason Zengerle on an extremely well-written article about the Kentucky Thoroughbred industry ("Horse Trade," May 13). I am a native Kentuckian, now five years transplanted to Northern Virginia. Zengerle managed not only to shock me—the horse industry sure has changed its views about slots since I've been away—but also to write a great magazine article. I have now read his last two paragraphs about the "racino" in West Virginia and the stunning race to the finish numerous times over.

MICHAEL W. NICHOLSON
Via the Internet ■

The editors welcome correspondence from readers. Please address letters to Correspondence, TNR, 1331 H Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20005 (letters may also be sent electronically to tnr@aol.com). All letters should include the writer's full name, address, and telephone number; be typed double-spaced; and be fewer than 200 words. Letters may be edited for space and clarity. Please do not send letters via fax.

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WASHINGTON DIARIST

Homeland

FOR A YEAR AND A HALF now, my husband and I have lived in a tall, tomato-red house near the southern end of Washington's Embassy Row. Built in 1898, the house had the exact combination of personality and sturdiness we had been looking for. Just as important, it came with an array of age-related quirks that scared away all other potential buyers. This allowed us to avoid the bloody bidding wars so common in D.C. these days—in which competing buyers start out offering a few thousand dollars above a house's asking price and wind up loudly impugning one another's parentage as commission-minded real-estate agents whip everyone into a frenzy of one-upmanship designed to drive the closing price higher than the GNP of a small African nation.

EVEN SO, AS WITH ANY FIXER-UPPER, we had to ask ourselves certain hard questions before committing. For instance, were we prepared to die one night in a ball of flame if something went wrong with the house's gargantuan, turn-of-the-century furnace? Converted from coal to oil back when Strom Thurmond was a jitterbugging young buck, the hulking, "modernized" unit—swathed in a thick, gray coat of asbestos—looked like something Norman Bates would have used to dispose of unruly hotel guests. Our insurance appraiser took one look at the toxic monstrosity and demanded that we install new smoke detectors ASAP. The precaution proved unnecessary: One month after we moved in, during a pre-Christmas cold snap, the furnace died, forcing us to cancel a trip to Hawaii, don every piece of clothing we owned, and huddle together under a mound of blankets for a week until a shiny, new gas unit could be installed.

SINCE THEN, WE'VE GROWN ACCUSTOMED to our house's uncanny knack for suffering leaks, breaks, and minor explosions within 48 hours of a scheduled holiday. With a passel of family in town last Thanksgiving, the oven expired at the precise moment every repair shop in the nation closed for the long weekend. Then, as we were packing for Italy last summer, lightning struck the roof, frying most of our appliances and blasting a hole in our newly repaired chimney. It's gotten so we're afraid to discuss holidays at home anymore, just in case the house is listening.

GOING IN, MY HUSBAND AND I understood that our house, because of its age, would require our endless attention. What we didn't expect was all the attention it has elicited from strangers. Because of its location, rarely a day passes without plump-shanked tourists from Kansas or New Jersey pausing on our walkway to snap photos and debate why we don't have a big flag out front like the other embassies on the street. If my husband or I happen to be outside, young mothers will grab their children, point, and shriek brightly, "Look! People!"—as though we were an exotic bit of local fauna. Activists protesting the wickedness of neighboring embassies plop down to rest on our steps. And once every couple of months, some old man with a funny hat and a crumpled map comes toddling up to our door, just to see what he can see.

FAR FROM ANNOYED, I AM CHARMED by such incursions. I view them as symptomatic of the way visitors see Washington in general: This is their nation's capital; they feel perfectly free to explore *their* monuments, *their* streets, and *their* buildings at will. (Except at the Capitol itself, where these days they'll hog-tie and strip-search anyone who even looks like he wants to stick a toe into a restricted zone.) Sure, I'd be happier if these merry explorers would stop chucking their empty Starbucks cups and Fudgsicle sticks into my hedges, but why nitpick? Despite the cheap anti-Washington blather spewed by politicians over the years, thousands of people each season feel moved to come here to celebrate, protest, mourn—or just see what they can see. By a coincidence of geography, my husband and I get to share a sliver of these people's "Washington experience." Unperturbed at having stumbled onto private property, they linger to chat with us about the weather, the neighborhood, or what it's like to have strangers traipsing through our flower beds at all hours. And in the wake of September 11, most folks who wander our way seem a bit happier, a bit prouder to be here.

OF COURSE, THE QUASI-PUBLIC nature of our residence also attracts reminders of the less glorious side of Washington. Returning from a dinner party late one Friday, I stood on the dark porch waiting for my husband to unlock the door. As he fumbled with the keys, I noticed a strip of something white next to my left foot. Squinting, I realized that the strip was, in fact, part of a shoe—connected to a large, dark lump of a man curled against the wall of the porch. Silent and motionless, the guy was either asleep, dead, or waiting patiently until the door opened so he could slit our throats and empty the house of its contents.

NOW, I WAS RAISED IN A FINE Southern family where the general rule is that if a stranger sets foot on your property at night uninvited, you shoot first, ask questions later. Twenty years ago my parents thought they heard a burglar in the kitchen; my father has yet to forgive my mother for reaching into the bedside table and, in her panic, arming him with a hairbrush instead of his revolver. (Appalled by D.C.'s ban on handguns, Dad is forever offering to buy me a nice deer rifle or 12-gauge, over-under Winchester for my birthday.) In Washington, however, the shoot-first approach is more problematic.

YES, THE CRIME RATE IS HIGH, AND some days the news makes it seem like every boy over the age of eight has his own assault rifle. To make matters worse, if one were to meet with foul play, there's a solid chance that the bumbling, beleaguered D.C. police wouldn't have a clue what happened to you until a year later when some guy and his dog stumbled across your remains in a heavily wooded area of Rock Creek Park. That said, there are an awful lot of harmless homeless folk who wander District streets looking for a safe place to sleep. Some curl up on benches near churches; others hide behind hedges outside embassies that they assume to be vacant at night. As I pushed my husband through the door, I was hoping our porch lurker had simply mistaken the house for some diplomatic building where he could crash undetected for a few hours. We briefly debated what to do. My husband wanted to wake the guy and ask him to leave. I voted to let him sleep—largely to avoid reopening the door. The discussion quickly became pointless: Roused by our arrival, however, the man crept off as soon as the coast was clear. Still, I went to bed thinking maybe all those friends who had fled for the relative safety and privacy of the 'burbs had the right idea after all.

BUT THE NEXT MORNING, THE tourists were back with their cameras and their kids and their chitchat about the neighborhood. And any thought of leaving our exhaustingly quirky, absurdly colored home—and the odd public-private bubble it occupies—again seemed completely out of the question. At least until our 30-year-old air conditioner gives out right before our beach vacation this August.

MICHELLE COTTLE

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ANTI-SEMITISM.
It's not a HISTORY LESSON.
It's a CURRENT EVENT.

Part 4. Teaching & Inciting Hate on a Global Scale

"Have no mercy on the Jews....Wherever you meet them, kill them." — Dr. Ahmad Abu Halabiya, sermon at Zayed bin Sultan Nahyan mosque, Gaza*

"Jewish organizations consolidated a hellish plan to take over the world..." — *Al-Watan,* Saudi Government newspaper*

"We warn the U.S. and advise her to get rid of the Jews."
— Abdallah bin Matruk Al-Haddal, Saudi preacher from the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, on Al-Jazeera TV*

Do we learn nothing from the past? Is the coordinated Arab hate campaign against the Jews in the Middle East to go unchallenged by government, religious and media leaders except in the U.S.? Can they ignore what happened in the 1930s in Europe and recently in Rwanda and Bosnia? Words can and do kill.

Official government newpapers and TV stations in many Arab and Muslim nations are engaged in vitriolic attacks on the Jews. Blood libel and Jewish conspiracy theories and Nazi-like lies are being repeated daily, no longer disguised as anti-Israel or even anti-Zionist.

At ADL we know too well people are not born bigots. They must be taught to hate.

And they are being taught to hate and attack the Jews and Israel and America in Muslim pulpits and by official Arab media and via the Internet across all boundaries — religious, cultural, political and geographic. It is time for world leaders and good people everywhere to join the U.S. in speaking out against this hatred that is being stirred up. ADL urges you to join in this fight before it is too late.

Visit **www.adl.org** for more information

Glen A. Tobias, National Chairman Abraham H. Foxman, National Director
Anti-Defamation League, 823 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017

ADL Anti-Defamation League®

*Source: MEMRI – The Middle East Media Research Institute

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Now's the Time!

Prescription drug coverage for seniors — Now's the time!

As Congress renews the debate over prescription drug coverage for American seniors, we reaffirm our support for creating a meaningful coverage benefit.

What is the measure of a meaningful benefit?

It must provide choice ... fully assist the poorest seniors ... spur competition ... include access to all medicines ... foster, not frustrate, drug research ... and permit those seniors who already have drug coverage — to keep it.

Prescription drug coverage for seniors? Now's the time!

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